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PSYCHE AND EROS

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No. I

Experimental Dreams Concerning Theoretical Subjects

By DR. OSKAR PFISTER, *Pastor in Zürich.*

Psychoanalysis has frequently been denied the right to regard itself an experimental science. It would be easy, however, to prove that in some respects psychoanalysis fulfills the requirements of experimental science even more strictly than many of the experiments of so-called laboratory psychology. To come to an understanding with our antagonists among the psychologists and to benefit the public, the objective onlookers, it is advisable to meet the critics with their own weapons and to satisfy the requirements which they consider indispensable in their own experiments.¹ Two of these requirements particularly it is difficult to fulfill, viz.: (1) *isolation*, which makes it possible to control all the factors bearing on the matter under investigation, and (2) *controlled variation*, which enables us to determine the exact rôle of every factor entering into the experiment.

Jung² and Silberer³, respectively, with their association experiments and their hypnagogic and lecanomantic experiments, have already synthetically verified the analytic discoveries of Freud. Valuable though their work is, these experiments satisfy the requirements of isolation and variation only to a limited extent. Schroetter's hypnotic experiments show an improvement as regards technique; but this cannot be said of Staercke's dream experiments which, depicting merely certain somatic excitations, are concerned with dream factors of only secondary importance. Hypnosis, however, brings about not only complete isolation from the outer world, and concentration upon the inner world, but also makes possible at the same time the freest kind of wilful direction through a factor which may be freely varied, namely, the hypnotist's will,—thus fulfilling in fairly favorable measure conditions proper for experimentation even though the experimenter does not have under his control every possible contributing factor.

Schroetter's work stands out as a promising beginning, although it lacks a psychoanalytic interpretation of the material furnished him by his experiments.

That young scientist's death excludes the hope of a further elaboration of the material by the author himself. I found myself impelled therefore to carry on in the presence of physicians certain hypnotic experiments and to make psychoanalytic use of the results obtained.

At first I induced dreams concerning single words; then dreams and post-hypnotic elaborations illustrating broader themes. The procedure adopted and analytic results obtained have been reported partly in a previous study (referred to above). In the present work I shall attempt to show how purely theoretic thoughts may lead to the building of dream fancies; how even intricate abstract problems find wonderfully poetic expression in dreams suggested in hypnosis.

I.

PHANTASTIC SOLUTION OF THEORETICAL QUESTION DURING HYPNOSIS.

Present, among others, a psychiatrist and a psychologist. The latter is hypnotized after he had been instructed to open his eyes upon feeling a slight handpressure on them during the hypnotic sleep and to read a paper which would be placed before him. Subject knows that some abstract topic will be the theme presented.

Five minutes after the experiment was begun the paper was held before him and became the object of his slow, drowsy scrutiny. The paper read: *Dream about the question whether ethical and religious thoughts of a high order are present in the Unconscious proper. Let your dream show the arguments for your assumption. Then forget all about this problem,—the question, the answer and your arguments in support of the latter.* The question was not quite clear; it failed, above all, to indicate whether the conception of the unconscious was to be taken in the larger sense, i.e., as including Freud's fore-conscious, or only in the narrower sense, i.e., merely the deeply repressed layers.

Five minutes later I awoke the sleeper, who promptly related:

"I have had a remarkable, an impressive dream; of the paper's contents I recall only the words "religious" and "unconscious;" that did not influence me.

"I started with an idea of sleep. I first pictured to myself the void of consciousness. That brought to my mind the idea of infinite space. I saw myself somehow floating and flying therein, freed, at any rate, from the earth. I had the feeling of being in an immeasurably big blue sphere, in wondrous azure blue; at the same time I heard magnificent strains of sound. What it was I did not know, but I had the feeling that the sound emanated from the sphere within which I was floating.

"What next? Oh, yes, I was flying through infinite space. This sensorial-optic impression changed suddenly to an abstract presentation, namely: if space is really endless, if I can not reach a boundary somewhere as I float through

it, our notion of space is absurd. There is no limited space. I am telling everything just as it occurs; whether it fits is immaterial. There is really no such thing as space at all; our idea of space is a fiction. This, therefore, proves that spiritism is right, that everything is of a spiritual nature and the spatial corporeal is a delusion. If everything is spiritual in its essence, then everything is conceivable. Thought has no spatial extension, consequently the concept of limitless space must also be rooted in something truly spiritual.

"Now everything changes again to a plastic image. Again I fly through space and come in contact with something,—I do not know whether it is on the earth or on some other planet. I reach the snow-clad peak of a tremendously high mountain, at least ten or a hundred times bigger than the Alps. The valleys are barely discernible in the great depths below.

"At this point I was disturbed by some talk outside the door. I got the idea of a monstrous dragon, possibly several, roaring in the depths below. I fly from peak to peak and see human beings in the deep valleys below fighting with one another like a disgusting swarm of vermin.

"And now came your theme.

"I am once more on a snow-capped peak, a very steep one, upon which it was almost impossible to stand. Suddenly the peak splits asunder and a black mass, like ink or paint, flows forth from within. It flows down on all sides. Suddenly the flow ceases. The mountain becomes an active volcano, throwing first a powerful volley of stones and dirt high into the air. I am not affected, although I am close by. I merely look on. The fire increases and is transformed into a glowing mass. At last it becomes quite clear, almost like gold, a golden stream being powerfully belched forth from the interior. The snow, exposed to the glow, begins to melt. I become frightened and think I am falling. But the sliding snow carries me down only a couple of meters. The sliding mass again becomes stationary, evidently because it had reached a cooler surface, and my slipping is also ended.

"Now I glide again through endless space and see the floating stars, wonderful brilliant spheres, like glass balls on a Christmas tree, and they seem fairly large. I move toward a star. Like a big sphere it soars before me.

"And what happened next? The star burst, exploded suddenly. Again I see the lustrous golden mass, which looks exactly like the substance ejected from the crater. This golden mass becomes more and more brilliant and suddenly I perceive therein a picture, an image of Christ, a bambino invested with a large golden crown. I see that for a time and then it disappears in a golden mass. The mass becomes whiter and more translucent. Hold on, no, that is not so! After the image of the infant Jesus disappeared, the golden mass persisted.

"And now suddenly I look towards the right and behold on the right side

a tremendous figure, shaped like a Latin X, such as is used in mathematics. I note that it is made of powerful iron rods. Now the sun approaches the figure X and the intense heat melts the iron so that it runs off in drops. At the same time it falls into the depths, and presently it is gone.

"Now the glowing golden mass becomes clearer and clearer; it is round and finally becomes almost quite white. At this moment the succession of pictures ceases somewhat; the white mass remained and I could not imagine what would come of it. For a fleeting moment I perceived the image of the white breast of a woman. Then it was gone.—

"The white mass stretches out again. Suddenly I see it no longer vertically in front of me, as hitherto, but horizontally and below me. It stretches toward the horizon as far as the eye can see. Suddenly I notice certain elevations on it. I have a momentary impression of Greenland—a tremendous ice field. Suddenly I notice in the midst of this icy surface a mountain, grown to an enormous height, and from a tremendous iceberg there again belches forth a fire, but no longer clear as pure gold, but a confused mass of fire and stones belching forth from a tremendous crater.

"Suddenly I discover that I am no longer in Greenland but at the South Pole. To the left of the crater I see on the icy surface the little, round solitary tent in which Captain Scott, the South Pole explorer and his two companions perished. At this point you woke me. Now my ring falls from my finger—clearly a symptomatic act." "Did I wake you too soon?" "No, the picture had not changed for some time; nothing new was coming up." ["Do you now recall the problem I set you?"] "Only 'unconscious' and 'religious'; also 'ethical,' I think. Then followed a long sentence. Your finger had covered one word on the sheet and that angered me in my sleep. Was it 'unconscious ethical'? No, that is nonsensical. It was probably the reverse: 'consciously ethical, unconsciously religious.'"

We shall now give the associations to the dream phantasy, and shall distinguish the stimulus word or words from the reaction words which follow by printing the former in square brackets:

[The endless cosmic space]: One of the most difficult problems.

[Floating]: Overcoming gravitation.

[Wonderful azure blue]: Splendidly shining; very vivid sense of sound; like striking on a crystal glass, but more tuneful. The music of the spheres.

[Perception of space]: I advised a patient undergoing analysis to abandon for a few days all speculation concerning space. I maintain that space and time do not belong to things-in-themselves, that the corporeal is only appearance. This makes the whole world more intelligible.

[Tremendous mountains]: Karakorum or Himalaya or some other glacial region. I am planning with great interest an expedition to the Caucasus.

[The dragon]: Evoked by the conversation. I revenge myself for being disturbed.

[The men fighting below]: Colossal, dirty mass of people, pitched against one another. I am tremendously indifferent to their struggles down there.

[A peak]: A man stands upon it—I; the dream goes on undisturbed.

[The mass flowing from the split mountain top]: * A crater; it is hot. The ground looks as if it were not over one centimeter thick. I wondered that I could remain standing. While thus wondering, I slipped. I did not feel the heat; I perceive it now. The stream of fire gets clearer and clearer. Finally it becomes like pure gold.

[Picture the scene to yourself and say what enters your mind!]: A blast-furnace such as I have often seen. The ore is being purified until it issues forth in a magnificently clear stream. I was enraptured by it. The stream of iron issued forth swiftly, somewhat resembling a snake and as if it were enraged. This is an extremely dangerous form of employment; many working at it suffer from accidents. But there is something magnificent about the energy and power it displays. When they melt lead the workmen throw a bag over their heads and approach the openings from which the molten lead issues with a long iron rod. The molten stream pours forth and burns a thousand holes in the bags. The people have a great deal of courage. We always took up a position at a respectful distance but for all that, if we were not very careful we occasionally got struck by a glowing particle.

[The snow melts]: I did not think it could possibly be so hot here. At that moment the snow melted.

[Picture it!]: Spring. The old wet snow glides slowly off the grassy fields. The odor of fertile land can be perceived.

[The "mass"; you described it as ink or black paint]: I think now, strangely, of axle grease. Some twelve years ago I met with an accident,—a street car nearly ran over me. I caught on an iron rod that was full of axle grease and saved myself. I would have been run over if I had not done this. The sticky hand disturbed me more than the rest of the occurrence. A few months ago I saw a man who had been run over by a train. He was a crushed mass from which blood and dirt gushed forth. I was surprised at the quiet, matter-of-fact manner in which the accident was taken. The train was disconnected, the body removed, and the train went on its way as if nothing had happened. It was characteristic of the mass in the dream that it did not spurt, although stones and dirt belched out of the crater high into the air.

[The crater]: The pressure within it increased considerably. The erup-

* Four days later we got the following associations to "lazy mass" and "crater":

tion is greater; the danger grows. I have never seen a crater in activity, but have read that exploding granades look like it. I believe the lazy flowing mass represents the unconscious before analysis. During analysis the pressure becomes greater. One is more easily reached.

[I feared I was falling]: I slid only a couple of meters. The snow got wet and could no longer hold on to its bed.

[I float toward a wonderful star]: A number of others were about but this star kept getting bigger as I approached it or it me.

[The bursting star]: Like the cracking of a glass ball on a Christmas tree, when it comes too close to the candle flame. In the Christmas tree an angel is hanging on an elastic band.

[The surface turns pale]: Morning is breaking; the stars grow pale.

[The golden mass after the disappearance of the Christ image]: A golden dish, a jewel-bedecked cup for the reception of the holy wafer.

[The great X]: On the right; the unknown. It is very big and of iron; a mathematical symbol; there is a meaning back of it. It is awfully rigid. In the dream I was in doubt about making little hooks at the ends of the strokes of the X.

[The hook on the X]: It looks like an ear; hangs there without a reason. At the end, I think, it was gone.

[The ear]: I often tease a certain youth about his long ears. I was pleased to see the iron cross bending slowly. Suddenly it disappeared.

[The mass becomes transparent]: Grey—white, formless. The vertical surface has become horizontal. A snowy landscape in cloudy weather. The danger of such landscape in murky weather; difficult orientation. I stand on a higher level than the landscape; the hills, therefore, seem insignificant. Presently I had before me the image of a sheet or shroud.

[Sheet]: Last night I examined my bed, fearing that someone had played a trick on me by placing a brush or something like it in it.

[Shroud]: In a few days I am to visit a dissecting room, something I don't like.

[Greenland]: Nordenskjöld, Nansen, Sven Hedin. I am immensely interested in exploring expeditions.

[The elevation tremendously enlarged]: Mount Erebus in the film of Scott's South Pole expedition. A mountain spitting fire in the midst of the south polar ice.

[The fire no longer distinct]: The dark smoke in the film ascends to the sky.

[Intricate mass]: Unexplained, dangerous, as the unknown in man is dangerous. Moreover, a mass of energy and strength may reside in the unknown.

[At the South Pole]: Scott starved to death only fifteen kilometers from his provisions.

[To the left Scott's tent]: His body still lies there.

["Do you perceive what theme was suggested to you?"]: "Something out of the unconscious emerges into the light with great force and energy. Fire and energy are also hidden in the ice. The ice and the lifeless country are only appearances; fire lurks in the depths."

This account can hardly satisfy us, even though a true insight is recognizable therein. I therefore propose to adhere to Freud's rules, i.e., to stick to the text of the dream and to the associations. At its beginning the dream is concerned with a difficult abstract theme, as was announced before the hypnosis, namely, the problem of space. The question may be asked why this particular problem was suggested. The reason probably lay partly in abstract and partly in somatic considerations; sensory impressions disappear in hypnosis, the cutaneous sensations are abolished, and consequently the person gets a feeling of floating through free space. Moreover, the dreamer has often preoccupied himself with the subject of space and considers it one of the most difficult problems.

The blue sphere is clearly a fancy suggested by the air-filled space. The music of the spheres is suggested by acoustic impressions suggested by the prospect of the heavenly expanse, as well as by the Pythagorean philosophy which concerned itself with the problem of cosmic space.

After a pause, which it is easy to understand in view of the difficulty of encompassing an abstract problem in a dream phantasy, the dreamer loses himself in philosophic reflections which, though they yield no original ideas and have much to be desired on the score of coherence, have at least the merit of attacking the given problem as vigorously as can possibly be expected of a dreaming person. The dreamt space-philosophy has its roots in the assumption, which the dreamer holds also in waking life, that space is something entirely spiritual. With that philosophic wisdom is exhausted for the time being. The dreamer, therefore, turns again to phantasies.

The former train of ideas is taken up again and spun out. Definite shapes come to the fore and we are on the qui vive as to what will come up for discussion. At this point there is a disturbance without—loud conversation becomes audible. The dreamer revenges himself by converting the persons talking into roaring dragons.

As soon as the disturbance ceases he returns to his peak. He flies to another peak and sees mankind like a swarm of vermin fighting below. The phantasy resulting from the first disturbance now becomes something typical. The dreamer fancies himself infinitely above the disgusting, struggling mass of humanity.

Here occurs the second disturbance. The analyst assigns the dream

problem. He gives precision to the suggested abstract theme by inquiring about the matters lying in the unconscious.

Notwithstanding the recurrent removal, the dreamer returns for the third time to his mountain peak. That he can hardly stand on it refers to an earlier dream and need not be dwelt upon here. We may say, the dreamer finds himself in a position which he cannot long maintain. Now the mountain top splits and there flows forth a dark mass not unlike ink or black paint. The associations appertaining thereto tell of his clutching the end of a street car bar, covered with axle grease, to save his life. To understand this we must know that the subject believes he must live a free sexual life ere he can revive the emotional life he had hardly known for a year. He tells himself that this is a disgusting but unavoidable necessity just as it had once been necessary for him to take hold of the greasy bar when his life was in danger. The man who had been run over in a similar situation had not held on and paid for his omission with his life. That means; from the depth over which I stand there issues filth with which I must occupy myself if I am not to be destroyed. Clearly enough this means ugly sexual desires which arise out of human nature, man's unconsciousness. But the mass soon ceases to flow: the remedy fails.

The mountain peak changes into a crater. The subject himself surmised that the increase in pressure and eruptive force allude to the intensification of the instinct which manifested itself at the beginning of the analysis. He was now really subject to a greater sexual urge since he had lost a part of his former emotional fixations. But the wild outbreak of his instincts cannot affect him; he stands by calmly and suffers not the slightest injury. This corresponds with his actual situation: he exercised complete control over himself, kept himself free from blame, and escaped without the slightest injury the psychologically unavoidable unloosing of the instincts (which were soon sublimated).

The fire turns into gold: the baser instincts are transformed into the higher impulses which issue from the same non-conscious source, i.e., from the fore-conscious. The beautiful gold stream flowing from the furnace above recalls the majestic power and energy inherent in the work of melting iron in foundries and the courage such work requires. The golden stream of ethical achievement, therefore, issues from the non-conscious, and—as our dream portrays—it does this with tremendous force.

The snow begins to melt: at first the dreamer was suffering from a lack of emotion; he thought he was cold; the ethical emotions powerfully breaking forth beget warmth. Even before he has any suspicion of what the dream is about, the sleeper associates spring and the odor of the fertile soil. But he fears an ethical fall. But the snow slides only a few meters and comes to a standstill as it reaches cool land. Sacrificing his peculiar and lonely emotional coldness

(cold heights) and accepting warm ethical standards do not lead to a dangerous fall; but once again he experiences emotional coldness.

After his beautiful description of the irruption of the ethical from the unconscious, as well as his return to and tarrying in this pure ethical realm, our poetical dreamer turns to another subject. The flight through space is continued; a wonderful star appears and grows larger, because the subject approaches it or it him. The resemblance to a ball on a Christmas tree results in a pleasant childhood mood, and this is heightened by the angel soaring near it by means of a trivial rubber thread. The childishness of the scene is indicated in this naive way.

At the center of religious ideals an image appears similar in beauty to that symbolizing the ethical rising out of the unconscious. The heart of this new world is represented by the image of the Christ child, crowned. The mystery of this wonder-child also vanishes but not without leaving those ethical forces behind, cleaner and purer. Thus a bright dawn is breaking for me.

But now an oppressive riddle, X, that I cannot solve, looms up. Religious doubts are stirring, for they mock me (hooks, long ears). But divine love—the sun—dissolves this stumbling-block in the path of thinking.

But this ideal religious world also vanishes. For a moment I recognize maternity (female breast) as its essence, then all this mysterious magnificence eludes me.

I find myself in an icy cold world of intellect that transfixes me with gloom, threats of danger and death. Out of the kingdom of intellect, too, powerful emotional quantities may spring, but they are not so pure and luminous as those of ethical desires and religious emotions. Great accomplishments await fortunate investigators (Greenland, Nordenskjöld, etc.). But unsolved scientific problems, too, may cause man's destruction (Scott).

The meaning of the assigned dream, as far as the main theme is concerned, may be formulated somewhat as follows:

At the height of my speculative thinking I experience almost unbearable aloofness. Out of the depths of my nature, there break forth hideous sexual desires to which I am persuaded that I must hold on lest I perish. But this device for saving myself fails me. Naturally, what emanates from my hidden nature can not harm me either.

Out of the unconscious (or, better, the fore-conscious) there arise also powerful ethical forces, especially courage and an urge to do. The enthusiasm they generate disperses emotional coolness, but I fear a fall from the heights of this ethical ideal; and, in fact, I do sink a short distance even though I soon assert myself again.

I long for an ideal religious world, into which I might raise myself, for a charming infantile-Christmas world whose center is the mystery of the child

Jesus. If then the mystery of His birth should also vanish for me, it would at least leave behind a pure golden glow, and a beautiful dawn would break for me.

But now there appears an oppressive, mocking doubt which divine love does not explain away but which it drives out of consciousness. For a moment I recognize motherhood as the true essence of the ideal religious world. But then the whole mystic magnificence leaves me.

At the end I find myself again, as at the beginning, in the cold, gloomy, threatening world of intellect. Out of its subterranean depths, too, strong emotions may issue and lead to great results, but these intellectual emotions are no longer so luminously pure as the ethical and religious ideals, and on their insoluble scientific problems the soul may starve to death.

The answer to the problem assigned therefore reads: out of the non-conscious there emanate not only sexual but also ethical, religious and intellectual ideas. Arguments are not expressly mentioned, but inasmuch as those contents and wishes are clearly indicated that would be superfluous.

What is the objective value of these statements? Experiments with hypnotic experiments teaches one not to attach too great value to them. What the dreamer produces under such circumstances, if it has not been suggested to him, corresponds exactly with what he would say in his waking state. As a matter of fact, our subject also expressed in his phantasy precisely what he would have said, only more clearly and soberly, in the waking state. What finds expression in a hypnotic dream is only the fore-conscious which is divided from consciousness only by a thin partition, and which proceeds from a very mild repression and not from that deep layer of repression which Freud has in mind when he speaks of the unconscious.

The subject's symptomatic act at the conclusion of his dream recital remains to be analyzed. His ring suddenly fell from his finger. He himself surmised that the little incident had some hidden significance. We analyzed it four days after the dream.

[The fallen (finger-) ring]: Yesterday, while in an inspection tower, I had a strong feeling that the ring was falling off my finger; I had to take hold of it.

[The ring]: It was given me by my fiancée; I intended to have it reset in a wider gold band, because it looks too much like a lady's ring. The stone is indestructible, or it would have cracked long ago, for I have been very careless with it. It would hurt me terribly to lose it, apart from any consideration of whom it comes from. The stone changes tremendously,—at times it is fiery bright, and at others dull. This may be due to atmospheric conditions.

The reader will have surmised already that the ring is a symbol of his love of the donor. This attachment, too, ought to be stronger; he behaves with

regard to it in a manner that arouses the suspicion of a hidden desire to be done with it, although he has kept up the relationship to the present time it, too, is subject to fluctuations. The fear of losing the ring expresses the hidden desire to be free of the love affair. This desire is not altogether outside consciousness, but meets with considerable resistance therein. The unconscious brings it to full expression by means of its cryptic language. A few weeks later he actually broke the engagement under circumstances not altogether dignified.

The symptomatic act after the dream report, taken in connection with the rest, has even more definite meaning and illustrates the ambivalence of symptoms. At its conclusion the dream dealt with the death of Scott, who fell a victim to his impulse to investigate. We know that the dreamer deduces from this a warning against intellectualism. May not the undesired loss of the ring be a reference to the loss of love, which has already gone very far, and therefore serve to illustrate or confirm the danger threatened in the dream? Without a doubt, analysis would imperil a love affair that had its origin in unconscious complexes. To be sure, such an unreal love would not be worth anything, but perhaps the unconscious does not acknowledge this. At any rate, it looks as if the symptomatic act meant: "See! understanding, intellectualism, has already bereft me of my love!" But in that case a hidden opposition to the analysis might arise and with it a disposition to withdraw from it and return with full force to his love. The situation is not clear. I had awakened the sleeper too soon; he would otherwise have overcome the temporary blocking of images as he had done previously in the dream. Having been awakened, he had to make use of another kind of symbolic language, viz.: symptomatic action. It is evident that the man vacillates between two wishes: in the dream, a decided preference for emotional values and a rejection of intellectualism dominated; in his waking state, as well as in the symptomatic act, the desire for understanding, or at least for freedom from a love affair which he recognizes as purposeless, predominates. The subject's interest in the analysis is in fact very keen.

This experiment in hypnosis has taught us nothing new as far as psychology goes, but it agreeably confirmed the psychanalytic concepts we already know. That even such confirmation is superfluous will be shown by the following experiment.

[To be Continued.]

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(Translated by Dr. J. S. Van Teslaar, Brookline, Mass.)

Emotional Conflict, Liberty and Authority

By THEODORE SCHROEDER, *New York*

"A man is never more unhappy than when he is divided by his desires."¹ That is the essence of the emotional conflict from which all of us suffer, more or less. What is true of individuals is equally true of social groups, whether the cleavage is horizontal according to economic classes, or vertical, according to national or racial boundaries. Our social conflicts present only a massing of individual or social; the unhappiness is proportionate to the intensity of conflicting desires.

In the individual we usually find that the "discreditable" aspect of the conflicting impulses is kept in hiding. That other aspect of our desires, which we have not attained, and as yet cannot realize, is forced into consciousness and on the public attention. We do this chiefly in response to the subconscious necessity for a neutralizer or compensation for our guilt, our shame, our feeling of inferiority. Thus, in as far as we are in the throes of a subjective conflict our emotionally valued moral, religious and political creeds and ideals express what we are not. The vehemence with which we manifest or uphold our ideals measures the emotional valuation and regret of our shortcomings. To be thus torn between regret for what we are, and anxiety as to what we wish to be, or pretend, is the psychologic essence of our sorrow. What is true of us as individuals, remains true also when we are acting in social groups. Thus it comes that our emotionally valued laws, our governments and our moral and religious pretenses are legal or moral fictions. To portray this emotional conflict of individuals as that is manifesting itself in group-action, is the chief purpose of this essay. First this will be stated in general terms and then illustrated by the recital of details, showing some social fictions in conflict with the facts of practice. At the end some remedy will be suggested.

Emotional Conflict in Social Relations

Our present institutions, all of them, I believe, reflect the collective dominance by those qualities which grow out of the emotional, moralistic conflicts of personal immaturity. Practically all is done on the level of childhood or adolescent emotions and unreason. One aspect of this conflict presents the demand to be free from parental authority and all authoritative dominance. On the

¹ Senault: *Use of Passions*, p. 475; Trans. A. D. 1671.

other hand the fact is that we have not the physical or intellectual resourcefulness necessary to make ourselves a success under freedom. We are in fact emotionally and economically dependent upon the good will and approval of our parental, or some other and familiar "higher authority." Whatever the objective reality of our conscious thinking may be, *we feel* inadequate, and emotionally dependent. Usually that will not allow us to break away from the more primitive habits of traditional and institutional guidance, which belong to our childhood and to the childhood of the race.

Of course, various persons are thus dominated, in varying degrees of completeness and of awareness of that dominance. In this situation the natural parent, and the state which serves the unemancipated "adult" children as a surrogate parent, both exhibit their own intellectual immaturity, by the all-but exclusive use of physical violence, both as a corrective and as a means to impose their own immature demands. These demands, or claims of right, are often a mere passionate and stupid wilfulness, conditioned by the same ignorance as that which makes it impossible for the child to dominate, as if by superior intelligence. Witness the childish behavior and infantile "bull-headedness" exhibited in conflicts between "captains of industry" and "labor leaders." Or, observe the conflicts between our public officials and industrial radicals, such as Bolsheviks, Anarchists and Industrial Workers of the World. Or, examine the international relations of the last five years. Are not all such contests conducted in the same manner in which ignorant and passionate parents deal with childish misbehavior? From the standpoint of my concept of evolutionary psychology it seems so.

In the individual's emotional conflict, our most passionate public pretenses always present one aspect of conflicting urges. That is to say: our moral passionate self-valuations are passionate, precisely because they represent what we want others to believe about us, and just because we have not yet achieved it. Where the masses and their political leaders are still floundering among these emotional disturbances of childhood, it is inevitable that public institutions and mass-action should exhibit the same conflict. Political and social institutions merely intellectualize or formulate that aspect of our conflict which does not yet represent a social reality, and which conflict is sufficiently common to permit of effective group-action. In other words, even collectively we are always pretending to be what we are not. Readers will get my meaning only in so far as they remember that I am using the psychologic approach to social problems. This means the abandonment of political mindedness, for a better understanding of the behavior of human impulses functioning in relation with popular creeds and institutions.

Fiction as Compensation

Thus we pretend to live under an idealized government described in our moral and legal fictions, or in an ideal universe described in our theologies. For

the critical observers the actualities of life are always disproving our fictions. However, this is never discovered by the great crowd and even seldom by their industrial and political leaders, who are so largely obsessed by it. These exhibit their obsessions in their mad scramble for power, as that supposedly can be achieved through the control of the legal fictions. By means of these fictions they hope to secure more than their share of the "loaves and fishes." For a long, long time the victims of these legal and moral fictions give the most passionate devotion to their fictions, because they are a phantasmal compensation for a feeling of inferiority, sometimes based in part upon their failure to secure satisfactory material results with material realities. This devotion will be passionate just in proportion as the subjective, industrial disappointment or conflict is intense. That is to say: we need a fiction just in the same proportion that our feeling of inadequacy our emotional need for a pretense is great. Just *because* our actual lives so greatly contradict the legal and moral fictions, are we in need of a compensating delusional grandeur, as a neutralizer for the feeling of inferiority. Thus it comes that practically all our institutions are built upon a social, economic, religious, moral or legal fiction, and therefore they all involve a contradiction. The fiction is that we love liberty, equality and democracy. In practice we calmly accept tyranny, privilege, slavery and aristocracy. The latter exist because we have not outgrown the infantile autocratic cravings. The fiction indicates a wish to be grown up. Thus we fool ourselves like the small boy who imagines himself a man because he is allowed to wear long pants.

Supreme and Human Despots

A good illustration of the working of our emotional conflicts can be found in our varying attitudes toward despots and despotism. In spite of His theoretic, infinite, despotic efficiency, people profess to love the supposed omnipotent celestial despot of the universe. We love this fiction of the infinite autocrat because He is only an idealized self. In Him we see the omnipotent creature of our own omniscient imagination, our own other self, a phantasmal self, projected into the universe. Just in so far as we approach the feeling of hopelessness and helplessness in dealing with our worldly environment, we acquire the need for an identification with a relative omnipotence in the heavens. This serves us as a neutralizing compensation for our impotence and enslavement here on earth. That is why times of distress produce most religiosity, and the personal moralistic conflicts of hysteria tend to promote mysticism.

We love this imaginary omnipotence of our own creation also for the reason that, unlike the earthly despot, we can defy Him with impunity. For example: We can proclaim a religion of brotherly love and yet go merrily on making ever greater military preparation to assure ourselves the profits of the next war. While professing to possess the revealed will of God, quite uniformly we act upon

the stronger of our contrary instincts. Thus we secure another neutralizer of our feelings of inferiority by a practical demonstration of our own super-omniscience and super-omnipotence.

The real human self, as we see that reflected in the enthroned and embattled weaklings of earth, we hate with the furies of our own hell, and sometimes we love it. We hate or love it with the exact intensity of our own feeling of inferiority. I believe this is so largely because, relative to God, the earthly despot is so very real, persistent and efficient in thwarting (and at times promoting) our personal urge to omnipotence, and our desire to wield unlimited power. On earth we hate despots other than ourselves, and love despotism when vested in, or exerted for us. In the skies we pretend to love the despot, but by actions we despise and repudiate his despotism. Because we can do this with obvious impunity it gives us feelings of grandeur. The earthly despot tends to be relentless. Our defiance of the little autocrat of Podunk is always punished. The Gods of our own creation always forgive. We hate the human despot not because he is despotic, but because we personally feel humiliated by his relative efficiency. That we do not hate him *as a despot* is shown by our joy when his despotism overtakes our enemy, or otherwise promotes our personal ends.

Our Divine Right to Be Despots

The late Tsar, the Ex-Kaiser, and many of their predecessors and contemporaries pretended to live by a conceded claim to rule by divine right, to exercise the political power of omnipotence. That was the fiction. The facts of practice were that they were very dependent upon the good will of courtiers to whom they made many concessions. Finally their dynasties were overthrown because they came to function too much out of harmony with the increasingly conscious desires of those whom they were least willing to take into account. Both before and after the fall of these almighty ones, actual power was exercised by the few but has always been actually vested in the mass. The few exercised the power in the name of the one, so long as they were acting in approximate harmony with the subconscious feeling-needs of the crowd. When its emotional necessities became conscious as desires and became materially changed, then their institutional manifestations also changed. Now a new fiction is created to justify a new minority in exercising the effective power. But this is no longer done in the name of God, or of the one, but in the name of the many. Because the former despots refused to facilitate the peaceful democratization of labor and of welfare, the neglected ones proceeded to do some forcible levelling downward. But the new authority and power once again is in fact only the authority and power of an efficient few, while the fiction will be that it is the power and authority of the mass. Inevitably it becomes the power of the few because there has been no adequate preparation for anything else, by means of the democratization of intelligence.

In the merely political democracies a relative few also exercise most of the power and reap most of the benefits of governments. The legal fiction is that this is not true, or that it is done with the express consent of the governed. However, that theory too is only a logical fiction for the solace of the disinherited. The fact is that the great crowd knows practically nothing of what is done in its name, nor how it is accomplished. Now as in all the past, we have a dictatorship of cunning and economic might. The legal fiction and outward formalities are that ours is a government of, for and by the people. But the dictatorship of our capitalists is neither more nor less absolute than the dictatorships of Tsar, Kaiser, Mikado, or Bolsheviki. Its methods are different and its personnel is a bit more uncertain and more shifting, and for that reason less subject to control. The dictatorship of our captains of industry, even as portrayed by their radical opponents, also has its fiction of the absolute. It can maintain its economic program only at the price of conceding and augmenting the power of agencies beyond its own immediate circle. This is done by promoting organized religious and moralistic prejudices that operate through, and measurably independently of the controlling group and of the state machinery, to uphold the status quo. In the future, as in the past, this will in the end produce a new might which will overthrow the powers that nursed it into being. Thus some kind of revolution belongs to the maturing of all youth.

In America, as elsewhere, the fiction is that authority and power are vested in all the people, as the State. Here, as elsewhere, the practice is that even a small unofficial minority can and frequently does usurp with impunity the accredited functions of the State, whenever such usurpation does not run counter to any conscious organized prejudice, nor run counter to the material interests of the dominant capitalistic dictatorship.² This is shown by our mobbings and lynchings of Socialists, Industrial Workers of the World, Anarchists, and religious heretics, by the Christian amenity of burning and lynching negroes, as well as by the Brotherhoods of Railroad Workers when they compel the government under threat of disaster to grant an increase of wages. How different is our devotion to law and order whenever such things happen to those who may be of value in upholding the established order! Our love of law and order is the fiction. Our love of those who have the economic might is the real motive power of our action. When the other (hate) aspect of our personal conflict over economic might becomes dominant a violent revolution ensues, unless devotion to the actualities of democracy facilitates a peaceful change.

Democratic Educational Fiction

The American Revolution was fought to establish a democratic fiction in place of a theocratic fiction. The democratic fiction is partly contradicted by a

² Report on the illegal practices of the U. S. Department of Justice.

protected claim of right, to continue exploitation, with only a change of beneficiary and a change in the channels of its theoretic sanction. Beyond the fiction everything went on substantially as before, manifestly because practically nobody really wanted a democratization of welfare. The means of achieving aristocratic privilege have been changed, but aristocracy and legalized privilege remain. We have a fiction to the effect that we establish State schools and Universities so that every one may have equal democratic opportunity for the higher education and for higher democratic service. The facts of life are that only a few, the children of the relatively privileged classes, ever can avail themselves of the opportunity for higher education. Practically no one thinks of service to democratization. Those with whom the need is the greatest for a protective education actually have the least chance to get that kind of superior development. See the realities for education of the poorest class and the legal discrimination against education of our negroes. Usually those who are educated think the least of being useful to accelerate democratization. Evidently we are not yet ready for the substance of democracy in education, and much less predisposed toward education for an accelerated democratization of welfare. We pretend to believe in the exalted virtue of education, and then pay our educators much less than we do our electrocutioner, our hangman or our useless office holders. In truth, the fiction of democratic education serves only as a means to prevent the achievement of a fuller democracy in the facts of practice. We seek and give education to the few, only the more efficient to obtain, to secure, or to maintain an aristocratic privilege. (The army tests applied to 1,500,000 soldiers showed an average intelligence age of 13 years.) The theory of an hereditary aristocracy is discontinued but the economic substance of aristocratic privilege, its fruits, remains as hereditary as in feudal days.

Legal Fiction of Equality

Our fiction is that government is founded upon equality and democracy, at least intangible essentials. In practice we pass without audible protest or even with public acclaim the use of deportation and prison cells against those whose chief offense may be no more than a demand that we live up to our fiction.³ Unfortunately for them they manifest our own degree of impatience in demanding that we show in resisting the actual democratization of welfare. We feverishly demand the supremacy of law and order, and yet practically never succeed in the efficient use of the law to suppress the uttermost of mob rule when that is used to uphold our pretenses and legal fictions.⁴ Witness the free speech fights in San Diego, Spokane, and a score of other cities.⁵ In each of these equality of intel-

³ New Republic 21 (no. 264): 96-98; Dec. 24, 1919.

⁴ See: Report on the illegal practices of the U. S. Department of Justice, Nat. Popular Gov't. League, 1920.

⁵ See my: Free Speech for Radicals. Enlarged Edition.

lectual opportunity and physical protection was denied. Our ancestors wrote guarantees of free speech into our Constitutions, so as to destroy the previous British practice and theory. Then our courts interpret those guarantees in harmony with the old, old principles used by the Star Chamber Court and the Inquisition. Our fictions make for equality and democracy. Our practice is the maintenance of the material inequality, the very essence of aristocracy. By our constitutions we proclaim everybody's right to know all that is to be known. In practice, we preclude nearly all concrete and effective intellectual attack upon the fictions of democracy, equality and freedom.

Our courts claim to enforce equality before the law but the idle poor who refuse work at another's wages are put in jail as vagrants,⁶ to protect us privileged parasites in the continued enjoyment of much more wasteful idleness. Judges love justice, except when they can inflict vengeance, savage vengeance, if the convict has dared to question rudely the sanctity of the legal fiction under which the judge functions. We legalize collective bargaining by stockholders of large and small corporations, but sanction the starving of workers into submitting to a denial of their claim of a right to do collective bargaining. We allow the laborer to vote as a human being and talk and deal with his labor power as a "commodity." Others, without provoking resentment, speak of the laborer as "animated machinery," and deal with him accordingly. Real democrats and some others, accept the fact that labor and labor-power are the inseparable attributes of a human being. The denial of that fact produces no audible protest from our "democratic" officials.

When the capitalist cannot patrioteer at his own price as a profiteer, it is perfectly lawful and not unpatriotic for him to strike and sabotage on the public. Even then the blame for his greed is often transferred to the alleged greed of the laborer. But when mere working man seeks to play the same game, or merely advocate the righteousness of that game *for laborers* we put him in jail or allow a mob to kill him.⁷ Again our practice denies the fiction that we maintain equality before the law, or that we maintain actual democracy under law.

Unity of Super-Patriot and Rebel

Everybody is willing to function under the fiction of recognizing the supreme authority of any existing state so long as it approximately fulfills the need for phantasies of grandeur and does not thwart too many of the affective needs of our autonomic system. A friendly group within the State organization always

⁶ Laws of Kansas, 1917; Chap. 167, p. 214. Also: Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 29:368 et seq. Under less offensive statutes the same result is accomplished in actual practice.

⁷ I have in mind the battle of Ludlow, the deportations from Bisbee, the assassination at Centralia, etc., etc.

becomes an alien and revolutionary group as soon as its special emotional and material interests become sufficiently conscious and are sufficiently discredited by the existing state organization. Especially is this so when the discredited minority begins to approximate a power adequate to enforce its demands by the use of physical force or by a new realization of economic might, such as is and has been holding them in check.

The fiction is that we are patriotic lovers of our respective governments and that devotion to established institutions is a moral virtue. The facts of practice show that by their action peoples always repudiate a government whenever and wherever it stands in the way of realizing a sufficiently strong and officially discountenanced emotional interest. In such cases the international encouragement of revolutions is righteous. Under other circumstances it is punished.

The psychology of the emotional conflict is such that those who are afflicted with the most intense devotion to any cause or institutions, as in the case of the most passionate hyper-patriots, are precisely the persons who can most easily be made the most zealous rebels, whenever existing institutions no longer satisfy their most ardent sentimentalisms. Temperamentally all these morbid ones are practically alike even though their morbidity, for the moment, expresses itself in seemingly irreconcilable theories or conduct. The morbid devotee of law and order, or of patriotism, usually escapes with his morbidity unappreciated as such, so long as his activities do not directly conflict with the material interests or emotional necessities of the privileged beneficiaries of things as they are. When the other aspect of this same morbid conflict of the emotions expresses itself in equally impatient and no more violent demonstration directed *against* the beneficiaries of supposed legalized injustice or of vested wrongs, then it becomes crime or treason. Yet temperamentally the two are alike. Because of this the hyper-patriot and super-radical so often exchange places, by making extreme reversals of policy. This was conspicuous during the war in the cases of radical international pacifist socialists who became most blatant militarists. We saw the same thing in many ardent governmentalist patriots who became militant pacifists. Both were simply expressing the other aspect of their pre-existing emotional conflicts.

Fighting for Fictions

Because mankind has been so largely functioning on the level of this conflict, we have sought reform through the adoption of a new fiction, a new law, or a new theory of government. Inevitably, therefore, our past revolutions have been practical failures when judged from the standpoint of the objective reality of their achievement. Subjectively they supplied a great satisfaction. We, the revolutionists and their successors, have shown our relative omnipotence by overthrowing the Almighty ones who had previously dominated in the name of God. Then we proceed to establish a new fiction of another rule by divine right. This

new fiction is expressed in the formula that "the voice of the people is the voice of God." Thus some assert their divine right to rule over the unnaturalized and other disfranchised humans.

The chairman of the Republican National Committee recently improved upon this theory of divine authority to tyrannize, in these words: "There is in this country a religious faith which believes in the divine origin of the constitution of the United States":⁸ as interpreted, of course, by or for the chief beneficiaries of things as they are. A multitude of constitutionally created petty officials are thus made to have the divine right of former autocrats. Now then every official tyranny, performed under claim of constitutional authority, has the same sanctity as the acts of the Kaiser or of King John. Names have changed. Our emotional conflicts and the necessity for similar childish superstitions remain much the same, and receive similar interpretations and formulations.

Feudal serfdom was overthrown, but we fought only the fiction of that time, by which feudal-mindedness *then* intellectualized its claim of right to exploit for privilege. The serfs and rebels themselves had not outgrown the feudal-lord's state of mind, or conflict. Hence they were satisfied with the overthrow of the fiction. Because of their own subconscious desire to exploit, the former economic essence of the slavery remained. The old conflict of desires continued to function and created new fictions and new forms with which to maintain a continued dominance by new modes of exploitation for the maintenance of aristocratic privilege, in new exploiters.

Chattel slavery as a divinely appointed institution became the new or perhaps only different and more delusive and lasting fiction. The serf, as a part of the soil, was outlived by the slave as chattel or his owner. Again we fought for the overthrow of exploiters and not of exploitation. Again our efforts were aimed at the fictions and forms surrounding exploitation, not at destroying the substance of exploitation. Thus a divine property right in the body of the slave was supplanted by a property right, generally held equally sacred to take from the worker the product of his bodily exertion, above a mere living. Such a living the feudal lord gave to his domestic animals, including the serf. Such a living the owner of chattel slaves gave his domestic animals, including the slave. Such a living we still allow our domestic animals and free laborers. But the substance of exploitation continues under the new forms and new fictions. Also: the discrepancy between the mode of life of the chief beneficiaries and chief victim of things as they are is greater today than at any time in the history of the world. Compare Mr. Rockefeller with the producers of his wealth working in Colorado mines. Then make a like comparison in the feudal ages.

This recital can be continued indefinitely because the conflict between our

⁸ New Republic 21 (no. 265): 145; Dec. 31, 1919. Also: La Follette's Magazine, 12 (no. 1): 9; Jan., 1920.

legal, moral, religious and social fictions and our actual practice is as broad as human activity and the law itself, and as deep as the emotional conflicts for and against dominance on the childish level. Also it is as near universal as the emotional conflicts of immaturity which afflict us humans still living in the throes of early racial adolescence. We are not yet willing (that is we are not emotionally able) to subordinate our disturbed feelings and their fictions, to the arbitrament of objective realities. Even where we have the desire to do so, we seem to lack the intelligence. Perhaps even the wisest among us do not yet have a sufficient understanding of the relations and behavior among humans to make the more intelligent adjustment possible. Certainly the world is nowhere showing any understanding or capacity for a peaceful adjustment to the natural process which is working under or behind our legal fictions toward bringing about *the* democratization of welfare.

In our social organism most of us are acting like Christian Scientists. The fiction is that there is no pain, no social illness. The "malicious animal magnetism" of political heresy consists in effectively denying this fiction and proposing to do something radical about it. The fact is that some parts of our social organism are suffering intensely.

Concerning a Remedy

Our emotional valuation of virtue is always the exact measure of our anxiety to dispense with it in *our own lives*, and to impose it upon others. Our problem then is: How are we going about it to outgrow this emotional conflict, these emotional valuations of our immaturity? How become grown up? How eliminate the conflicts and their fictions? First of all, we must outgrow our childish sentimental idealism, which makes us pretend to love the non-existent or the impossible. When we become content with striving to attain what is practical, according to our best understanding of the relations and behavior among things and humans, and earnestly seek to enlarge that understanding then we may also find it worth while, to strive only for the attainment of what is humanly possible. So, instead of enforcing unintelligently conceived ideals and instead of justifying infantile phantasies of omnipotence, all to be achieved by childish methods of violence, we will only seek to understand natural law as that is behaving in the course of human evolution. Then we will help everybody else to make the best possible adjustment thereto, by *actually* democratizing education, and by educating for an accelerated democratization. When most of us have achieved a comfortable mental and emotional adjustment to the natural law of democratization, similarly understood, we will necessarily also have secured a comfortable adjustment to one another. When even an important minority of us shall have a fairly clear idea of the behavior of natural law in the evolution of the social organism, and such a minority shall be agreed to conform their personal lives therto, we will

have little difficulty in persuading the rest of humanity to do likewise. Until then we will uphold our fictions or fight to change them as children must do. This is the only way known to most of us for "saving our face" from confessing the shame of our shortcomings in our actual social life.

If we could somehow become efficient in the process of accelerating the democratization of labor, of education, and of welfare, we could have a natural healthy and peaceful "levelling" upwards. As we fail in this, the gulf between the fortunate and the unfortunate classes will ever widen and the possibility of a mutuality of understanding will become ever more remote and difficult. Ultimately always comes a revolution by violence and a forcible "levelling" downwards. Which shall we have? Shall we continue to make the choice blindly and unconsciously? Which are you promoting by your habitual, unpremeditated conduct, or by your subconsciously conditioned sympathy or more conscious active aid; or by your indifference?

From one avenue of approach we may describe the personal emotional conflict as being between a self-indulgence which requires a forfeiture of the good will of others, and a self-denial which brings desired approval from a select few. Out of this conflict in the social realm comes the seemingly irreconcilable sociologic theories of individualism and collectivism. Individuals formulate one or the other of these theories and give it more or less of moral valuation, depending upon the intensity of their conflict. The choice depends upon which theory of social relation seems most likely to insure a satisfaction of the immediate needs of the autonomic system. The dualism of individualism and collectivism is the creature of our internal conflict. In nature so such dualism exists. In fact these conflicting theories merely present different and incomplete aspects of the same evolutionary process.⁹

Still other persons, more conscious of both aspects of their conflicting desires, evolve theories of the interaction between individualism and collectivism, as if these were separable entities. Such persons tend to develop a moral value and duty for theories of compromise, through which they hope to achieve autonomic comfort. When individualism, collectivism, or compromises are sought to be imposed as a moral duty or as a personal right, we may be reasonably sure that those who seek to impose them are still floundering in the realm of the emotional conflict and that the theories advanced are mere intellectualization by which they hope to impose their will. When this is not so, then they will be content with such results as can be achieved from imparting to the fullest of their "superior" understanding and a willingness to enlarge that understanding by the acquisitions from the store of knowledge of the most humble or even the most passionate. At this stage of development we place a maximum of confidence upon a mutuality of

⁹Psychic Aspects of Social Evolution. *Liberal Rev.*, June, July, 1917.

understanding arrived at when all parties are obsessingly anxious both to understand and to be understood. But this can only occur when both sides have the benefit of approximate equality of intelligence and freedom from morbid or specialized compulsions.

Those who are functioning above the level of the emotional conflict will scarcely erect theories of individualism, collectivism, or compromise into something of moral virtue. Neither will they dream that such theories solve any problem. Our problems are dominantly problems of the emotional conflict. When this is not so we see all ultimate social and moral theories as being but different incomplete aspects of the relations and behavior among things. From this view-point we automatically recondition our desires to function in harmonious adjustment to natural law, as that is understood from time to time. Furthermore, such persons conspicuously seek to enlarge their understanding by new and ever larger synthesis and to help others to a like understanding.

Now the solution for social conflicts, like those of individual conflicts, is seen to be in the outgrowing of the emotional conflicts that underlie. This means a kind of sterilization of the emotions rather than their forcible suppression. In the individual internal conflict it means the unification of seemingly opposing tendencies, by getting onto an intellectual level above the desires and mental processes which are characteristic of the emotional disturbances. That means at least the elimination of that aspect of the conflict or impulse which is least in harmony with the natural behavior of human beings acting in harmony with social evolution. This theory applied to the social conflicts means a mutuality of understanding to be arrived at above the level of the personal emotional urge, i.e., by means of an inductive study of the relations and behaviors of humans in process of social evolution. Such a mutuality of understanding is impossible except on the basis of an approximate equality of education and of understanding. It can never occur while substantially all the cultured knavery and educated cunning is enlisted upon one side, in the making of special pleas for moralistic theories that promote personal ends. Nor can it come into being while that same group controls the education and the manufacture of those unenlightened formulations of emotions, which are now flatteringly called "public opinion." Mutuality of understanding is something very different from tricking the other fellow into theoretical or formal approval of the words of our creed or contract. He must also knowingly approve all that it means to us. We must be willing and eager to the uttermost to understand and to be understood. Such a meeting of minds cannot occur in the economic realm until we have democratized education. The test by which we may judge the willingness and the intelligence of our desire to avoid social violence, is the zeal we put into the achievement of democratized education and education for accelerated democratization. If we are unwilling to do something to promote that, then again our professions of a desire

for peace is only another fiction by which we hope to have our way without our victims understanding and valuing as we do all that we mean to accomplish thereby.

When we have outgrown approximately all the emotional conflicts, we are for the first time able to face ourselves and our problems with relatively impersonal eyes, such as can see the problem as a whole, quite detached from and uninfluenced by specialized personal interest. This then is the grown up democratic method. In the sense of psychic evolution, it is the scientific approach to all social problems. If those who now control the education, publicity and economic might of the world, were sufficiently removed from infantile desires and mental processes, to meet social problems in this manner, then there could not have been a World War, nor could there be proletarian revolutions. Just to the extent that we have not outgrown our juvenile conflicts, such wars and revolutions are inevitable. The more we use infantile modes for the violent suppression of economic and political heresy the more certain and the more violent will the ultimate revolutions be, for such is the inevitable psychology of the emotional conflict.

There can be no lasting peace until most of us are eager to submit our contentions to the arbitrament of the facts, equally understood, and equally free from fear. We cannot thus voluntarily submit our childish phantasies and feelings of grandeur to the arbitrament of the economic realities of democracy, except by the process of outgrowing them. We cannot have the facts, that is, the relations and behavior among things and humans, equally understood without democratizing education. We cannot have peaceful social evolution without education for democratization. What are YOU going to do about it?

The Human Situation in War and Peace

By ISRAEL SOLON, *New York*

One fact emerges with greatest clearness from a study of human behavior in industrial society, and that is the fact that what is generally accepted as civilized society places an ever-increasing value on the process of human behavior. On the process as distinct from the product. In field after field of human activity industrial civilization has shifted the interest and emphasis from the product of human effort to the process, to the technique of human behavior; from the end factor, which is supposed to give human behavior its purpose and meaning, to the performance of the act itself. Industrial societies have subordinated the ends to the means; the ends have been made the concomitants of the means; the products have been made the by-products of the process. Human behavior in industrial societies is not teleological but ritualistic.

I shall enumerate some few fields of human activity in our industrial civilization in which the interest has shifted from the product to the process. The reader will add such further illustrative data as he may find necessary.

All science attends strictly to process: the process being correct, so it holds, the product must necessarily be correct. What is known as the scientific mind and scientific temper is a disposition that attends to and relies upon process wholly. The much-praised objectivity and detachment of mind is a concentration of mind upon the process to the exclusion of product. The logical man is one who attends strictly to process: he ignores all subsequent conclusions but centers his attention on the technique of thinking. The logical man sees to it that he concludes rightly and gives himself no trouble about the right conclusions. The reasonable man, so to speak, hews close to the line and lets the chips fall where they may. What is known as "Scientific Management," or the "Taylor System," sets out deliberately and persistently to define and control the process of an industry, and it aims specifically and explicitly to detach the interest of both the management and the operatives from the product. "Scientific Management" treats product as incidental to, as an inevitable concomitant of, process, and as nothing else. All

legal procedure, all jurisprudence, is expected to attend strictly to process. No judge or jury may have an interest in the product of their behavior: they are expected to know nothing of their subsequent findings. Modern organized charity, in so far as it is scientifically and dispassionately conducted, has shifted its interest from the product to the process: from the ends of charity to the correct procedure in the dispensing of charity. Civilized love, or what is called romantic love, is a shifting of interest from product to process, of which the product, the sundry new individuals, are not the product but the by-product, when they are not the result of accident. Psychoanalysis centers its attention on the process: the cures that result from psychoanalysis are the concomitants of what has been called the diagnosis.

It would be interesting, no doubt, but out of place, to attempt to point out the economic advantage and the security that accrue to the wealth-controlling class in our industrial civilization from this shifting of the interest from the product of human labor to the process of industry. Besides, though hunger and love meet at the mother's breast, as Professor Freud has pointed out, as indeed hunger and love meet at the breast of all of us, psychoanalysis has thus far chosen to ignore the economic conflict. It would take me too far afield were I to attempt to examine with any degree of thoroughness the factors responsible for this shifting of interest from the product to the process; but it were best, I think, to call attention to some few of them.

One factor is the erotic satisfaction that accompanies the activity to which Dr. Ernest Jones has applied the charming mid-Victorian euphemism "the education of the sphincters." Also, it cannot be without significance that the Greeks, who have given this movement its impetus, had also shifted their erotic interest from the object to the aim of love, as Professor Freud has pointed out, of which their queer practice was a concomitant. But, to non-Freudians, the strongest appeal is most likely to be made by the fact that "Social Control" can best be exercised upon, can most effectively function in, process. For, social sadism notwithstanding, society is far more vitally concerned in the prevention of lawbreaking than in the punishment of lawbreakers. And, finally, as we shall see later when we come to examine Professor Freud's charming essay, charming in its spirit as well as in its style, "Reflections on War and Death," it is also interest in process that, incidentally, causes many of the infamies of war.

A likely objection had best, I think, be anticipated. Viewed superficially, it may appear that interest in process is not limited to civilized human behavior only. It might strike some that interest in process characterizes the behavior of even instinctively-responding organisms. But that would be a mistake. What specifically characterizes instinctive behavior is not interest in process. Knowledge of process is a late acquisition for even man. The secret back of instinctive behavior is absence of choice. Not only is the instinctively behaving organism

limited in its behavior by its organic structure, but it is also forced to limit and simplify its external environment so as to make its few organic tools available. The bee-hive and the ant-hill owe their existence, their form and their structure, to the fact that but for their being, and being as they are, the bee and the ant could not utilize their limited organic equipment.

It is the absence of choice that gives the instinctively-responding organism the semblance of certainty; for, as we shall see later, it is the absence of choice that gives *us*, that gives man, the feeling of certainty. We experience the feeling of certainty when we are confronted without alternatives. Choice means doubt and hesitation. It is not a fact that instinctively behaving organisms are infallible. What is true is that, being without choice, they respond instantly and in but one and the same way, without ever changing their minds, as it were. It was that fact that led Professor Bergson astray. Professor Bergson saw response that was instant and unchanging, and his anthropomorphism led him to interpret that as the result of unerring choice. A sweltering infant will kick off its covering and find relief; but there is no choice in it: it kicked because it could do little else when irritated. Instinctively-behaving organisms are less liable to err than reasoning man, to be sure; just so are dead men less liable to make mistakes than living men. Scientific bee culture leaves us no doubt but that what determines the bee's behavior is not an intuition but organic and environmental limitations. Bees, ants, and wasps are infallible, when they are infallible, because they have no choice. And, being without choice, they know nothing of process. But of this more later.

And now let us proceed to examine the elements that constitute what I have chosen to call *The Human Situation in War and Peace*. That done we shall be in a better position to enter upon a critical examination of Professor Freud's "Reflections on War and Death."

Every human situation (including the present one, of course) contains, first, ourselves, next, those who serve and obey us, and, only finally, those whom we must serve and obey. That is what had best be called the ideal human situation. The actual situation is commonly different.

For it is a fact, laudable, as some will have it, lamentable, as I think; but a fact in either event, that civilized mankind, which I should be the last to defend, the normal and hard-headed and practical class of civilized mankind, ignores the non-menacing and yielding and submissive facts of life just because and to the extent that these facts are non-resisting and friendly and servile. The only facts of life that civilized mankind is careful of and attentive to are the hostile and brutal facts. It will no doubt sound axiomatic to many of us to say that to learn to live is to learn to live with and among the perilous; to be educated is to be informed how to deal with the dangerous. Many of us will no doubt be willing to subscribe that "To be forewarned is to be forearmed." Or, to quote the proper

son of a famous philistine, "Fear it, sister; best safety lies in fear." It were hardly an overstatement to say that the vast bulk of civilized social effort is devoted to what may be described as the erection of signposts bearing the legends, "WARNING! DANGEROUS!" "STOP, LOOK, AND LISTEN!" As a result of the fact that civilization devotes its best attention to the brutish and menacing facts of life, for the normal and stable and what is generally thought to be the better class of civilized mankind, the human situation is reduced from three factors to two: normal man and that which threatens him. Or, to state the same thing in psychoanalytic terms, for the normal man the human situation contains only himself and his father. The "civilized obedience" mentioned by Professor Freud (p. 27) is obedience, boorish or rationalized, but blind in any event, to the father's mandate. The mother, being friendly and complaisant, normal man leaves out of his reckoning.

I shall venture but one psychological cause for this; or, rather, one predisposing cause:

Our reasoning faculty is never called into a situation except where habitual practice has broken down, where something that used to obey us has suddenly rebelled. The more readily any fact of life yields to us the less attention do we give it. Were we to find ourselves in a world peopled with an infinite number of gods and all of them doing on the instant our slightest wish, we should never know we were alive or that there were such matters as discreet facts. The old philosophic problems of being and becoming, the one and the many, time and space, free will and predestination, would have no existence for us. We owe our consciousness of life, the little that we are conscious of, and our knowledge of the facts of life, meager as that is, to those facts that refuse to obey us. Our reasoning faculty has been called into being and is fashioned upon facts that are obstreperous. Small wonder that our reason takes a truculent attitude towards the facts of life!

Now, it is an indisputable fact that this simplified human situation, the situation with but two factors, ourselves and the menacing, has proved a profitable one for a considerable class of our civilized society. I am willing to allow that the belligerent attitude towards the facts of life has passed the pragmatic test successfully. Most successfully, thus far. Our industrial civilization does boast heaps and heaps of chattels. Civilized industry has brought the civilized nations a veritable clutter of things. And it may well be that these heaps and heaps of chattels and things are the real goods of life, and all argument is thus settled. And there's an end on it! When the enemy has been despoiled the war has been vindicated and justified. That is reasonable and logical, surely.

But it is at least thinkable that life has not yet been despoiled of all its goods. We are pillaging life of its things: it may be that things are not the most precious goods that life holds. It may even be that the goods of life are not to be got by plundering. What a grewsome tragedy, what an awful mockery it would be if it

should turn out later that all our efforts, all our monstrous labors and infinite pains, were to no human purpose!

But there is still another consideration; small, perhaps, and insubstantial, surely, but withal undeniable, as the history of even our industrial civilization will testify to; and that is the fact that men reason and urge even where there is never a thing to urge and over nothing at all. There is no doubting it. And so it may be said in all fairness that the debate about human values is still on. It should, therefore, not be wholly amiss to call attention to sundry facts bearing upon the normal man's truculent attitude towards the facts of life, in addition to such bearing as these facts may have on the points strictly at issue in this essay.

Let me make an extravagant assumption. Being a normal man and, therefore, a hard-headed realist, I must get me to the market-place; and, having been correctly educated, I tote my gun along, that an emergency may not find me unprepared. Presently I see a man emerging from a doorway. I recall instantly that best safety lies in fear, and I make with seemly haste for a telegraph pole, from behind which I peer with one eye, my right hand on my hip pocket. The man retreats hurriedly, only to return a moment later, behaving in a most suspicious manner. Not to surrender an advantage I open fire on him instantly. The man blazes away at me. I say to myself, "There, see! I guessed it!" The man and I continue to fire at each other until all the chambers of both our guns are empty. Then we both retreat cautiously, but with honors even. Our precaution in having made these hostile assumptions about each other had saved us from being untimely ended.

And yet! How are we ever to be really certain that it was our belligerent attitude towards each other that had saved us and not our poor marksmanship?

There is still another point to be considered in this connection: our distrust of each other's intentions may have lost each of us a friend. Or, to put it otherwise, our hostile assumptions about our father's intentions towards us may actually make them more belligerent towards us than they otherwise might have been. The devil must be as black as we paint him. How could he be otherwise? But, might it not be that had we tried white in place of black, or even some charming color, that we should have at least equal success? In short: How can we ever be even humanly certain that we do not ourselves in part produce the hostilities that we later find in life?

And, what may even be the saddest part of the entire sorry business, it may be that all this while our mothers were and are waiting to befriend us. It may be, it may well be, that if, instead of spending our best powers on propitiating our mothers, we should have done as well as we had done and are now doing. Or even better! How can we be so altogether certain, as so many psychoanalysts seem to be, that it is utterly wrong to assume life to be friendly and not hostile? The results alone do not prove it; for these may be due to our acting in accordance

with our hostile assumptions. Or, to state the same thing in precise terminology: What is it that makes so many psychanalysts certain that it is altogether wrong to live according to the "pleasure-principle"? What is it that makes the "reality-principle" more than a brutish fact called by a pleasant name?

For, that I may make my difference with many psychanalysts as clear as I can, let me assert that what constitutes the psychic inferiority of the psycho-neurotic is not his attachment to the pleasure-principle, as any psychanalyst may convince himself if he will but examine the economic factor in the psycho-neuroses. Those who are economically sufficient may, and vast numbers of them do, live out their lives successfully wholly by the pleasure-principle. Those who are economically powerful are precisely in the same category as the new-born child described by Dr. Ferenczi in his essay on the "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality." Wishes *are* horses. It is only the poor who may not ride them. The rich do ride their wishes, and they never need to stop riding them so long as they remain economically sufficient. It is only the poor man's wishes that are fantastic; the rich man may realize all his wishes, and in that way never come in conflict with the so-called "reality-principle." It is the economic factor that only too often decides whether a given person is psychically sufficient or neurotic. What ails the psycho-neurotic is that he is a dis-synchronised personality. He is at once infant and adult. He is an unco-ordinated personality. He is a house divided against itself; he is unable to decide on the how of the what; he would go in one direction while he is being drawn in another. Often enough what is wrong with the psycho-neurotic is that he is unable to renounce the so-called "reality-principle."

If the reader will now bear in mind the argument presented thus far we shall be better able to understand what is to follow. I am hoping that all my readers are already familiar with Professor Freud's aforementioned essay. Such as have not yet read it will be enabled to follow the argument by the resumé and the references and the direct quotations that will appear from time to time.

Professor Freud tells us that two factors have caused the stay-at-home much spiritual misery during the war. One of them was the disappointment caused by war; the other was the altered attitude towards death forced on him by the war. The causes of the disappointment were likewise two; one being the fact that the morality of the most civilized states had proved to be far feebler than had been expected, the other that individuals of the highest culture had proved capable of brutal behavior.

The civilized state, Professor Freud states, had forbidden its citizens "to resort to lying and cheating, which are so extraordinarily useful in competition with others. The civilized state considered these moral standards the foundation of its existence; it drastically interfered if any one dared to question them and often declared it improper even to submit them to the test of intellectual criticism." Then came the war, and the civilized state placed itself "above all restrictions

pledged in times of peace, the so-called rights of nations; it does not acknowledge the prerogatives of the wounded and of physicians, the distinction between peaceful and fighting members of the population, or the claims of private property." [The present writer does not mean to hold Professor Freud responsible for the failings of his American translators.] It behaved as if it wished to monopolize wrongdoing in the way it monopolizes salt and tobacco.

"Let the reader not object that the state cannot abstain from the use of injustice because it would thereby put itself at a disadvantage. For the individual, too, obedience to moral standards and abstinence from brutal acts of violence are as a rule very disadvantageous, and the state but rarely proves itself capable of indemnifying the individual for the sacrifice it demands of him. Nor is it to be wondered at that the loosening of moral ties between the large human units has had a pronounced effect upon the morality of the individual, for our conscience is not the inexorable judge that teachers of ethics say it is; it has its origin in nothing but "social fear." Wherever the community suspends its reproach the suppression of evil desires also ceases, and men commit acts of cruelty, treachery, deception, and brutality, the very possibility of which would have been considered incompatible with their level of culture."

"Thus the civilized world-citizen of whom I spoke before may find himself helpless in a world that has grown strange to him when he sees his great fatherland disintegrated, the possessions common to mankind destroyed, and his fellow citizens divided and debased."

Let us note in passing that, as a non-combatant, and with friends and interests, economic as well as intellectual, in both camps, Professor Freud's position in this war was an uncommonly trying one. Finding himself in a similar position, Bernard Shaw, being an Irishman, began to lay about him, to right and left with equal vigor. Romain Rolland, on the other hand, being a Frenchman, "went up in the air" and got lost in the clouds. Professor Freud, logically enough, placed himself in the position of the "civilized world-citizen." It was a trying position to be in; for he had at one and the same time to attack and defend, to denounce and to justify both sides, to themselves and to each other; and all this with the strictest impartiality. He could not own an interest in the result. His success we shall judge presently.

There can be no doubt that up to this point (p. 16), both by direct statement and by implication, Professor Freud aims to make us understand that *it is the civilized state that forces renunciation of evil desires upon its citizens; that when the state removes its repressions the citizens fall back into evil ways; and, furthermore, that this renunciation results in a loss to the citizens of the civilized states.* The Old Adam lives on in all of us, with additions, but without any change, Professor Freud tells us further; and we are held to decency by the precept and example of our more powerful betters. Lying and cheating are paying means to

get on with, only that the community forbids them. Acts of violence are advantageous and the state is but rarely able to reimburse us for denying them to us; and so, as soon as the state itself begins to behave in evil ways, the citizens do likewise. Like fathers like sons. In short: Professor Freud agrees, then, as it were, with Robin Hood that "To rob and pill is a good life." It is only that the civilized state forbids it.

All this, to my thinking, is so grossly erroneous that I find it hard to understand how so superlative a mind as that of Professor Freud could have been guilty of it.

It is a gross error to believe that the ethical life is less profitable than the evil life; and it is a gross error to believe that it is the state that holds its citizens to the ethical life. And since Professor Freud's arguments rest largely upon these premises, I shall proceed to disprove them at some length.

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It is not true that lying and cheating are profitable. Stated paradoxically: the success of lying and cheating, when achieved, proves that truth-telling and fair dealing pay better. For lying is counterfeit truth-telling, and cheating is sham fair dealing. Both lying and cheating, to be profitable, must have and presuppose a large body of truth-telling and fair dealing to thrive on. The liar and cheat, if he is to obtain any profit by lying and cheating, must go among those accustomed to truth-telling and fair dealing; he must have honest traders on whom he may live as a parasite. Counterfeiting can be profitable, even when not interfered with by the state, only as long as there is a far larger amount of genuine currency; and counterfeiting must continue to become less profitable with the diminution of genuine currency or the increase in volume of the counterfeits. Let counterfeiting go on indefinitely and without any interference from the state and it will debase its own value. Only bandits and raiders may live by violence, but they must live as bandits and raiders, and they must have a large body of honest producers to prey on. Rats may thrive, and frequently do thrive, in the hold of a grain transport; but they thrive not because they are rats, but because men ship grain. To be sure, men will exterminate the rats in the hold as soon as it will appear cheaper to exterminate them than to let them live; and that may make it appear that it is the extermination that keeps the rats down. But the essential fact here is that it is the grain shipped by men to men that enables rats to live at all. And surely there can be no question as to where the bulk of the grain goes. The English shop-keepers feared the German shop-keepers, and they feared them not because the German shop-keepers were liars and cheats; nor did they fear them because of the German army with its violence. If the German shop-keepers

had been cheats and liars they would have been feared by nobody; they would have been commercial rats, for all their industry. No, their industry would have made their position the more desperate: the more industrious they would have been the sooner and the more certainly would they have exterminated themselves. The German shop-keepers were feared because, being industrious, they were also scrupulous and fair dealing. And the historic fact is that truthful, fair dealing, industrious Germany stood in a fair way of winning the world; whereas unscrupulous, violent Germany came very near to destroying itself along with the rest of the civilized world.

Let there be no doubt on this subject. I do not mean to say that the civilized states had not made use of force and violence to keep their citizens from falling into evil ways. That was and is, and no doubt will long continue to be, a fact. What I hold is that *ethical behavior does not require force and violence to recommend it*. Ethical behavior has intrinsic merit. Honesty is the best policy. Ethical behavior pays; and behavior that pays is good behavior because the pay is what we are after.

Professor Freud permitted himself to fall into a common error. He saw the civilized states forbidding lying and cheating, and he observed the citizens abstaining from lying and cheating; and he later saw the same states remove the banns, and he found the same citizens resort to lying and cheating. He concluded therefrom that repression, "social fear," produces ethical behavior. Certainly if Professor Freud had analysed his own behavior he would have found that it was not the result of social fear.

What I have said of ethical behavior requiring no social coercion to recommend it calls for the following modification: Social morality is like an instinct in this, that it provides and exacts a mode of response in all instances such as is profitable in only the great majority of instances. Social morality, in other words, is a dogmatic assertion, and with continually decreasing coerciveness, let it be noted, of the successful experiences of the race, on the whole; and the mischief of social morality is in that it makes use of violence and repression, and thus prevents the individual from discovering for himself that ethical behavior is paying behavior.

And, aside from the fact that large human units can be best controlled only by more or less conventional, more or less dogmatic and arbitrary rules of behavior, there is this one other factor that tends to bring social coercion to the fore; and that is that absence of choice gives us the feeling of certainty and rightness. When a given mode of behavior has been determined for us by society we need no longer wrestle with alternatives and the consequences of wrong decisions and subsequent reproaches. Where there is but one way to behave that one way is necessarily the right way. It is for that reason that law and religion become more inflexible and arbitrary as they become sterile and lose their everyday practical

value; that is why the demand for conformity is so frantic in time of war. We dispel uncertainty when we eliminate choice.

Thus far, it will be recalled, Professor Freud had not concerned himself with the causes of the war, except to express regret that so tragic an event should have come to pass. He had but discussed the disappointment of the "civilized world-citizen" (who was also a "stay-at-home") with the unethical behavior of the civilized states and their civilized citizens. Professor Freud now goes on to say that, as a matter of fact, we had let ourselves in for our disappointments. We had harbored an illusion, for the reason that, like all illusions, it was pleasanter than the reality. As a matter of fact, he argues, great masses of mankind are kept to decency and the ethical life not by inner compulsions but by social rewards and punishments; and in that way they live on a manifestly higher ethical plane than their own natures require or even warrant. They had lived above their moral means, and so were what might objectively be described as hypocrites. The civilized state, interested only in overt behavior without concerning itself with motives (or, as I should put it, the civilized state being interested only in process), knowing nothing, consequently, of the fact that large numbers of its citizens were already living beyond their moral means, continued to demand ever more renunciation. Then followed the collapse of the moral structure of the civilized state.

"These discussions have already afforded us the consolation that our mortification and painful disappointment on account of the uncivilized behavior of our fellow world-citizens in this war were not justified. They rested upon an illusion to which we had succumbed. In reality they have not sunk as deeply as we feared because they never really rose as high as we had believed. [I don't dare to correct this atrocious translation, so that the reader will have to think the subject matter into correct English.]* The fact that states and races abolished their mutual ethical restrictions not unnaturally incited them to withdraw for a time from the existing pressure of civilization and to sanction a passing gratification of their suppressed impulses. In doing so their relative morality within their national life probably suffered no rupture." Pp. 29-30.)

"The earlier psychic state may not have manifested itself for years but nevertheless continues to exist to the extent that it may some day again become the form in which psychic forces express themselves, in fact the only form, as though all subsequent developments had been annulled and made regressive. This extraordinary plasticity of psychic development is not without limits as to its direction; one can describe it as a special capacity for retrograde action or regression, for it sometimes happens that a later and higher stage of development that has been abandoned cannot be attained again. But the primitive conditions can always be

(*Properly translated, Freud's sentence reads: "They had really not sunk so low as we had feared—for they had never, as a matter of fact, risen so high as we had believed."—Am. Ed.)

reconstructed; the primitive psyche is in the strictest sense indestructible." (Pp. 31-32.)

I must confess that I am still puzzled as to which or what was responsible for the dissolution of civilized morality. Was it because the states had made too great a demand of renunciation upon their citizens? Or was it that states had wished to indulge themselves in an immoral holiday and so were disposed to permit their citizens a taste of immorality for a while? I believe that we have not been told.

Whatever the psychologic causes of the war may have been, I do think that we must all agree with Professor Freud that regression to infantilism had taken place. The conditions in America point the same way. Here we had the veriest epidemic of infantilism. We need only recall the infantile obscenities that we met with everywhere. "S. O. L.," for instance, and the obscene word that very nearly every boy writes with the first piece of chalk the first time he attempts to write anything. It was used in every possible form and on every occasion. The soldiers were always spoken of as "boys," and in all war industries the "bosses" addressed their operatives, crews and gangs as "boys." The popular songs were those that had been popular during the infancy of those who were now soldiers, munitions workers and shipyard gangs. Thus "After the Ball" was revived after a lapse of twenty years. Countless times a day one heard some wailing voice unburthening itself, "Just break the news to mother; she knows how dear I love her;" and the young men in the concentration camps, many of whom had paid no attention to their mothers in years, suddenly developed a pathetic hankering for their mothers—not for their fathers, be it noted. I know of some ludicrous instances of this mother-longing. The American Red Cross Society capitalized the recrudescence by proclaiming itself "The Greatest Mother in the World." It even exhibited posters of a huge woman clasping a sick soldier to her breast.

But, while agreeing fully with Professor Freud that what had occurred, was a return to infantilism, and while there can be no question as to the barbaric behavior of the civilized states and their civilized citizens during the war, I find myself unable to agree that it was a craving for primordial immoral behavior that caused the war or brought the immoral behavior itself about; nor can I accept the explanation that the social demands for renunciation had proved too exacting, and had so caused the breaking up of the entire moral structure. I hold, on the contrary, that the barbaric behavior of the civilized states and their civilized citizens was a subsequent, collateral and incidental fact to the return to psychic infantilism; and that the return to psychic infantilism was in itself a war measure. I assert, in other words, that *the states forced upon their citizens a return to infantilism as a war measure*; and the barbaric behavior followed in consequence: with the civilized states the barbaric behavior followed as a result of the centering of the attention strictly on the war process; and with the civilized citizens the

barbaric behavior followed as a result of the fact that *laboring adult bodies were placed under the guidance of their infantile psyche*; for their somas did not regress with the regression of their psyches. And, furthermore, once the war was on, in addition to the fact that the states required the infantile psyche as a war measure, for reasons that will appear later; the citizens, once the infantile psychic state had been brought about, were lured by the infantile psyche, also for reasons that will appear later. As a result, a situation was brought about into which the moral categories of peace times entered, if at all, only by intrusion.

I shall discuss first how the placing of the infantile psyche in control of adult citizens brought about a situation in which moral categories did not enter, except by intrusion. Next I shall discuss the function of the infantile psyche in time of war, and why it is invoked by the state in time of war.

The first thing to be remembered when setting out upon a study of infant psychology is the physical feebleness of the infant as an engine for carving external reality, as an instrument with which to affect brute matter. The organic tool at the disposal of the infant's psyche is weak and extremely limited. Aside from the few gestures of crying, kicking and grimacing, by which it makes manifest that irritation is present, present without even knowing whence, what, or where irritation is being experienced—aside from the few gestures there is nothing the infant can do. And it is this *inability to do* that *limits the infant's ability to understand*; for the ability to do and the ability to understand are co-extensive. In that it is like its elders. When we say that we do not understand we mean that we can do nothing with the information imparted to us. "I do not understand you" means "I can make nothing of what you are telling me." Psychoanalysis makes use of a figure of speech when it says that the infant is guided by the "pleasure-principle." The infant knows no categories. Let us remember, then, that the infant's ability to do defines the extent of the infant's knowledge. *The infant understands nothing that it can do nothing about.*

The preceding sentence contains the crux of the matter. The infant knows nothing of what it cannot bring about; and it knows nothing of what it cannot do. The obvious and practical differences between the infant and the adult are due to the differences in their abilities to do. The adult knows more and understands better than the infant because the adult can do more and better. The adult knows both how to make matters come to pass and how to prevent their coming to pass; the adult has a memory that presents him with the history of past behaviors in similar situations—and all because he can act, because he is capable of effective overt behavior to correspond with his knowledge. Furthermore (and this is of interest beyond my present purpose, because of its bearing on the theory of repressions), whenever our knowledge is greater than our ability to do, then our ability to do must be added to, or else some of our knowledge is repressed, "forgotten," negated in some way; until a more or less stable equilibrium, permanent or tem-

porary, is established. What all this amounts to in the case of the infant is that, apart from its few gestures, being unable to avert fatality, *the infant does not know the fatal. To the infant there is nothing irrevocable.* The infant assumes the world to be friendly because it could do nothing with the contrary knowledge.

And now I must take issue not only with Professor Freud but also with Dr. Ferenczi. Since the infantile assumption that the environment is friendly not merely fits its own limited equipment but is also adequate for the real situation, as proved by the fact that its assumptions work, and since it is the situation and the result desired that are the final judges as to whether a given behavior is real or fantastic, we must assert that the infant's assumptions in the infantile situation are real and not fantastic. It were fantastic of an infant with an infantile equipment to behave otherwise, or to try to behave otherwise, than it actually does behave. In short, being unable to prevent disaster, the infant should and does know nothing of the disastrous.

And it is, in fact, the fact that the infant knows nothing fatal and irrevocable, that comes finally to give the infantile psyche its "immoral" character. It is not because of any law of psychogenesis, it is not because "the primitive psyche is in the strictest sense indestructible," as Professor Freud teaches us it is because the infant knows nothing fatal and irrevocable that it permits itself like the Queen in "Alice in Wonderland," so many executions. The infant knows no death, hence it does not hesitate to kill. And in that, likewise, it is akin to the adult. We venture more when we play for matches than when we play for money.

I believe that I am now warranted to assert that wherever and whenever the individual is confronted by a menacing situation that he is unable to avoid or to convert to a desirable end, there the infantile psyche, which knows no fatalities, to which nothing is irrevocable, to which reality is synonymous with pleasurable—that being most true which is most pleasurable—there the infantile psyche will be in a most favorable situation to claim the interest, the attention of the individual and the surrender of his personality. Whereas the adult psyche in war can only insist on calling the attention of the individual to the menace of his situation, a menace which he is unable to avoid or to mitigate, the infantile psyche can offer the soldier immunity from fatality. And this offer, as we shall see later, is not wholly fantastic. It is no mere opiate that the infantile psyche offers the soldier in war.

All this results in a situation that is as pathetic as it is paradoxical. The higher the type of the individual, the more cultured and sensitive and humane he is, the more clearly he realizes the ghastliness of war and the more strongly he abhors it, the more forcibly does he find himself driven to fly from the adult psyche and the more irresistibly is he lured by the infantile psyche. The finer the individual, humanly considered, the more painfully does he find himself pressed into psychic infantilism, where no such monstrosities as war are known.

And here is the foulest treachery of that treacherous situation: Once this fine human being has surrendered himself to the infantile psyche, then the very same facts that he had fled from change their character for him completely. The same facts which, when judged in the light of adult understanding had been too monstrous and awful to be accepted, when they come under the sway of the infantile psyche suddenly become pleasant and quite all right. For, as we know, the infantile psyche knows no facts other than pleasant facts, a fact being real to the extent that it is pleasant; and pleasant, I had perhaps better add, to the first person in the human situation, to the first person in the mundane trinity—to the ego. It is thus that war brings about a monstrous situation in which an adult organism with adult requirements and adult abilities, well-equipped to rob, rape and pill, is placed under the control of a psyche that has no ethical categories, that knows no renunciations; but which, on the contrary, knows that what is pleasant is quite all right. And, withal, as we shall see, there is nobody about to say anything to the contrary.

We thus find that in time of war men, and good men especially, are driven into psychic infantilism by the intolerableness of the real situation and by the allurements of the infantile situation with its state of bliss, where wrongs cannot be and where wrong cannot be done, where everything that is pleasant is good; and that, finally, the very facts that had revolted the humane and sensitive individual and driven him into psychic infantilism, the facts themselves then change their character and become not evil but good; for they then come under the sway of the infantile psyche, to which the pleasurable is the only good and true. The conclusion is therefore forced on us, so it appears to me, that it was these singular facts, and not "the call of the wild," not the primitive impulses, not the socially enforced renunciations, that were responsible for the brutal behavior of the civilized citizens.

I shall now proceed to defend the proposition that the civilized states forced psychic infantilism upon their citizens as a war measure; and that the inhuman behavior of the civilized states and their civilized citizens, in so far as this behavior did not result directly from the character of the infantile psyche, was due to the fact that in the present war interest had shifted from the product to the process, from the end of the war to the technique of war. I shall treat this second factor first.

The old conception of war was perhaps best stated by General von Clausewitz when he defined it as "nothing but a duel on an extensive scale" in which each side is determined to impose its "will" upon the other. Bernhardt agrees with this view, and he further lays great stress upon attack and defence. It was in accordance with this view that, at the outbreak of the war, France rushed every soldier mobilized to the firing line as rapidly as he could be got there.

Had the war come to a quick termination, it is quite probable that the old

conception of war as a duel many times multiplied would have prevailed to this day. It would have been believed that the ablest duelling nation had won the war. But before the war was many months old it had changed into a war for "positions," or, as it is more popularly known, to a "trench war." Entire peoples, with all their social resources, were thrown into the war. The man at arms, the duellist of former wars, became but one of the units of the vast war organization and fighting force; the bayonet, the old duelling implement, and other side arms, became "cleaning up tools"; the rifles and even the machine guns and all guns of flat trajectory could not be brought into use until the guns of high trajectory had done their work at long range. With entire nations and all their resources at war, the line dividing war industry from peaceful occupation was wiped out; all human industry became war industry, more or less direct, as required. Citizens were shifted from factory to firing line and back again as the war process required it; "captains of industry" were made into captains of the war process; and even writers, actors, artists, philosophers, orators and political "spell-binders" were driven into the war process. There were still "stay-at-homes," as in former wars, but there were no longer any non-combatants. "Work or fight!" became the law of the land; and work meant work at an "essential" industry, essential to the war process. Old men, women and children became reserve armies, active, most of them, at one or more removes. To say, therefore, that this war was a war of "positions, *material*, and attrition," as so many writers do, is to attempt to define this war by a few of its outstanding characteristics. What is important is that this war was a scientific war.

This war was scientific not by virtue of the fact that it mustered in all science and scientific devices. What made it truly scientific was its attention to process. It concerned itself wholly with means. The various battles that were fought were the scientific culminations of tremendous and precisely integrated processes. The "front" in this war reached all around the globe. It were even more correct to say that in this war the "front" had moved back to the extreme rear. The men in the firing line did not *go* "over the top"; they were *pushed* "over the top." They were forced "over the top" by all the precedent factors and operations. The integrated war process made the going "over the top" at a given time compulsory and automatic. The army in the firing line did not go "over the top" until all the other armies had gone over their tops and were pressing upon the firing line. If there were any old time duellists in the firing line and if they went over the top because of their bravery and not because the war process had made that final gesture both automatic and unavoidable, they no doubt paid for it with their lives instantly or they were court-martialled later.

To be sure, this attention to the war process was not a reasoned choice, but the inevitable result of the magnitude of the task and the number of items involved. It was the staggering sum of the factors that made strict attention to

process the only possible behavior. Now, it is in the nature of all behavior that attends strictly to process that it makes each step in the process forced and inevitable. When the vast war organization centered all its attention on the war process, in so far as it was loyal to the logic of the process and daring enough to act consistently with it, it excluded all considerations that were not relevant and included everything that was expedient and properly belonged to the war process. A scientific war scientifically conducted availed itself of all scientific factors and excluded all others. Finding that the war in all its ramifications covered the entire globe, logic required that the entire globe be declared a war zone; when all the citizens of the warring nations became members of the fighting force, at the firing line or elsewhere, active or in reserve, the logic of the situation required that the entire population be declared belligerent. Then it could only be left to expediency to regulate the point of attack. We must not permit ourselves to be deluded by a euphemism. This was admittedly a war of attrition on both sides; and attrition is but a sinister euphemism for "war upon women and children." The nation attacked is not likely to cry aloud when it is struck in an invulnerable spot, unless it aims to mislead the attacking army, in which case it is the attackers who are the losers; in any event, it is the attacking army that is most concerned when it wastes its fighting force. This war, in so far as it was conducted scientifically, necessarily availed itself of all scientific considerations and excluded all moral considerations. For, as we all know, moral considerations always are excluded from the scientific process. In so far, then, as the immorality of the civilized states and their civilized citizens was not due to psychic infantilism, it was due to the loyalty to scientific principles and the force of logic.

Aside from the factors thus far enumerated as having contributed to the moral delinquency of the civilized states and their citizens, there is one other factor yet to be mentioned; a factor that I would designate as *the reversal of the human situation*; a factor that, I may add, this war had in common with all other wars.

This war began, as I believe all other wars began, with a complete surrender to the father. As has been pointed out many times by Professor Freud, Dr. Ferenczi and other psychanalysts, though in different connections and in different language from that which I am about to employ, it is we ourselves who, normally, emerge out of the chaos first; after us come our mothers; and only finally our fathers. That is to say, normally, it is our own ego that is the first person in the human triad; those who serve and obey us come next; and those whom we must serve and obey come as the bad third. Practically, as I have pointed out earlier in this essay, the human situation in our industrial civilization is normally reduced from three persons to two—ourselves and the menacing, or ourselves and our fathers. This war, as all other wars, had reversed the normal human situation. During the war, the father came first; next came those who

served and obeyed him. Whereas in peace the father as well as the mother, and all social resources and social equipment, are placed at the disposal of the new individual, in war the new individual (together with the mother and all social resources) is placed at the disposal of the father. It is almost as if the *elan vital* had been brought up short in a blind alley, out of which it had to back and retrace its steps before it could again resume its progress, the normal evolutionary course was reversed for the time.

Space forbids my going into an examination of the means whereby the state was enabled to bring about the subjection to the father. I can do no more than merely mention the hypnotism *en masse* which brought the psychic infantilism about; but the result was an infantile subjection to the will of the father.

That is the meaning of the army regulations that forbid the officers to fraternize with the soldiers. It is the "pater" and not the "frater" who is obeyed. It is for the same reason that, wherever possible, officers are chosen from among the ruling classes. It is because the officer plays the father rôle that, in countries where there is a prejudice against the Jew, there is also a prejudice against placing Jewish officers over non-Jewish soldiers. It is because the American negro is willing to accept a white man as his father, whereas the white Americans are not willing to accept a negro father, that we in America have white officers in charge of negro regiments but no negro officers in charge of white regiments. Furthermore, and by the way, it will be found that the psychical and cultural relationship existing between the officers and soldiers of a given nation correspond to the psychical and cultural relationship existing between fathers and sons in that nation.

The psychic infantilism, as I have mentioned earlier in this essay, is of some direct service to the soldier, and not merely as it accrues to him by reason of his citizenship in the warring nation. For, the infantile psyche, knowing nothing fatal and irrevocable, knowing nothing, in fact, but the pleasurable, enables the soldier to incur greater risks when ordered by the commanding officer; and, as is well known, the more daring the charge the greater are the chances of escape for those taking part in the charge.

But the infantile psyche, because of its ignorance of the fatal and irrevocable, does not merely aid the soldier to act with greater seeming bravery. It also enables him to kill without hesitation or compunction when he is ordered by his superiors, the father substitutes. And it is this greater readiness to kill at command that prompts the state to enforce psychic infantilism as a war measure. But, I had better state at once, that it is not the sole reason for the enforcing of psychic infantilism by the state in time of war, as we shall see later. It is also this happy-go-lucky psychic infantilism that is responsible for the stay-at-home's altered attitude towards death, and of the paralysis of his activities, mentioned by Professor Freud (p. 48). The paralysis is not due to the altered attitude towards death, as Professor Freud contends; but both, the altered attitude and the paralysis

of the stay-at-home, are due to psychic infantilism.

The altered attitude towards death that Professor Freud speaks of, though without making it quite clear, is the quite apparent composure with which the death of large numbers was accepted during the war, this being wholly different from the peace-time attitude towards death. But, obviously, if the psyche prevailing during war is one that knows nothing fatal or irrevocable, it is to be expected that it would accept death calmly. It is likewise psychic infantilism that is responsible for the paralysis of the stay-at-home. It is due to the fact that he, unlike the soldier, was left without instruction and guidance. The soldier had all his behavior laid out for him. He had to obey orders and perform duties. All choice and responsibilities were taken from the soldier; but not so from the stay-at-home. Of him, also, infantilism was expected in countless ways, but without strict instruction and guidance. Consequently, he was at the same time being thrown upon himself and his own resources. This required of him that he should be an infant in all matters pertaining to the state and its requirements of him and an adult in all matters that affected his own personal interests. The result was a dis-synchronised personality, a frustrated personality, very much akin to that of the psycho-neurotic. That is the meaning of the riot of law-making that took place during the war. It is not the fighting men that clamored for more laws, but the non-combatants. They wanted laws to tell them how to behave so that they would not be left without guidance. It is only the sentimentalists who believe that laws are made by the powerful to enslave the weak. It is the weak themselves that want to be told how to behave that they might escape from responsibility. They do not want to be left to their own devices. They want to be told in all instances how they are to act, without choice; for, as we have seen before, it is absence of choice that gives us the feeling of rightness. To the infantile psyche, in other words, that government is best which governs most.

Now that we have found that it was not the desire to behave unethically that brought the war about, but rather that the unethical behavior came about collaterally and incidentally, the question what caused the war still remains to be answered. We also have yet to account for that singular phenomenon that I have named *The Reversal of the Human Situation*, which, as the reader will recall, asserts that in time of war the entire social organization and all social resources are placed at the disposal, not of the new generation, as in times of peace, but of the father.

The causes of war have undoubtedly been many; in some of them the psychologic elements have been dominant, in others the economic. I shall state one of these economic theories, in perhaps an excessively condensed form, and in psychoanalytic language; for the reason that it seems to bear the anal-erotic character traits that we should expect to find in a sound economic theory. It is this:

Peace results in an accumulation of large deposits of wealth; these deposits

of wealth in time come to produce in their possessors a fear that they will be disturbed in their possessions; this fear leads them to establish an armed guard, to insure their undisturbed possession; the armed guard, with the continuance of peace, comes to fear that unless it is set to function actively it will atrophy; it thereupon detaches this fear for itself from itself and transfers it to the deposits of wealth, thereby greatly exaggerating the already existing fears of the possessors of the wealth, which had been increasing with the growth of the piles of wealth; and it is these possessors of the piles of wealth who finally set the armed guards to slay all who are presumed to have had designs upon the piles of wealth. I am hoping that the editors of *P. and E.* will think it worth their while to expand this theory and its interpretation.

I shall state the most commonly ascribed cause of the war, "Militarism"; for the reason that, incidentally, it is in substantial agreement with my theory that in war there is a reversal in the human situation.

"War," J. A. Hobson says in "Democracy After the War," "is the red flowering of militarism and leaves behind it the end of more militarism," and the characteristic of militarism is the "will to power." Militarism, he tells us further, is primarily for the protection of the ruling classes against democracy.

Just what is meant by the terms "militarism" and "democracy"? Why is it that some elements in society fear "militarism" and some "democracy"? Who are they?

Stated briefly, the army that is most feared by those who fear militarism is the army in which the soldiers are most "disciplined," that is to say, most obedient to the commands of the officers. In short, it is not the soldiers but the commanding officers who are feared; and "officer," as I have already mentioned, is but another name for "father." I need not state that those who fear militarism are not the same as those who fear democracy. Democracy is feared by those who want the "rabble kept well in hand." In short, the enemies of democracy are those who do or wish to play the father's rôle.

Thanks to the genius of Professor Freud, the readers of *P. and E.* need not be told of the hostility of the son toward his father; but the reader may need to be reminded of the hostility of the father towards the son. We have not merely the "Oedipus Rex" of Sophocles; we have also "The Master Builder" of Ibsen. The "fear of the young generation" is the fear of the son. When we find known liars and hypocrites crying against a war on "women and children," we may be certain that they are crying against war on men and fathers. In fact, we may assert it without the need of more proof than we all possess that all "reaction" aims at keeping intact or restoring the power of the father; and that all reform, under whatever name, but attempts to take away power from the father and give it, generally, to the son; but sometimes, as in the instance of the modern woman's movement, also to the mother and daughter.

A Disturbance in Eating Analyzed

By DR. WILHELM STEKEL, Vienna.

Neurotic disturbances in eating are extraordinarily common. Almost every neurotic has his peculiar idiosyncrasies. One "can't bear the sight of coagulated cream in his milk," another can't swallow anything fat, a third is nauseated at the sight of a juicy red steak, the fourth can't bear liquid foods, a fifth can eat only solids, a sixth must get up almost hourly at night and take a nibble of some food or he can't sleep, a seventh gets attacks of heartburn at definite hours, and so forth. These peculiarities can invariably be explained psychanalytically. It appears that in these neurotics the mouth is an "erogenous zone" and that the patients were kept at the mother's breast a long time, got into the habit of sucking or chewing [candy, pencils, toothpicks, tobacco], and are fond of dainties. Most of them have repressed some sexual impulse (fellatio, cunnilingus, cannibalism, necrophilia, vampirism). The repressed urge gets linked up with the act of eating, and the inhibition is transferred from the sexual impulse, which stands under a moral veto, to the act of eating and this then becomes subject to the same veto. But the following case shows us that one must not jump to the conclusion that every eating disturbance is "sexually determined."

A man of 32 came to me with the complaint that for ten years he had been suffering from a distressing disturbance in eating; he could swallow only liquids and even these only at certain times. He had least difficulty in the morning. Because of this he has arranged it so that he eats his heaviest daily meal in the morning. During the day he can swallow only fluids; at night he can take a few bites of something firmer. His affliction consists in having to watch himself every time he swallows anything and in being tortured by the fear of something sticking in his throat and choking him. Meats and other very nutritive foods cause him the greatest difficulty, whereas dry (plain) bread often goes down with surprising ease. He is also afraid that the food may go down the wrong way, i.e., get into the larynx or trachea.

He had been repeatedly examined by means of the X-rays and flexible bougies but nothing abnormal could be demonstrated.

The first thing the orthodox Freudian thinks of in such a case is a fellatio fantasy. The patient's history shows a perfectly normal sexual life. He masturbated very little, began normal coitus at 15, had had an affair with a seamstress for a number of years and is now living with a trained nurse whom he expects to marry shortly. He is quite potent, has no inclination to any per-

version; his childhood was free from any homosexual experiences and from any abnormal tendencies.

Apart from the eating disturbance he has no neurotic symptoms, is very competent and industrious and was clever enough to find himself a very fine position during the war. While he was in active service he lost a great deal in weight, owing to his difficulty in eating, and was transferred to a "soft job" in the Hinterland.

In reply to the question when his malady first manifested itself, he narrates the following experience:

Some ten years ago, when the world was still wrapt in peace, he was stationed in S as a one-year volunteer. One day, just after some strenuous military exercises, being very hungry, he entered a restaurant and saw a comrade devouring a sirloin steak. He called out: "Waiter, bring me a steak like that!" He pounced on his food and ate ravenously, swallowing big bits of meat in rapid succession. Suddenly one piece stuck in his throat and he had to gag it up,—and could eat no more. Since then the difficulty in eating has steadily grown worse, has become systematised and as a result of bad medical management has become "fixed" and has taken the shape we have described.

The very first day of his treatment he reported the following dream: *I am in a corridor which has an opening on one side showing a frightful chasm. I cling to the right side and reach a small door through which I pass. Then I find myself in a really perilous situation on a roof and in constant danger of falling. There I behold a very pale and emaciated little boy walking up and down. I am surprised that he is not afraid and ask him how he can walk about so fearlessly.. He says: "That's nothing! My mother made me an angel!" Then I notice he has wings. Now he rises in the air, looks at me very solemnly and sadly, and suddenly flies away. I feel forsaken and awake with fear and palpitation and can't fall asleep again.*

The corridor reminds him of a courthouse in which he was employed in an official position. He has a faint recollection that in the dream he had been summoned to defend himself, as if he had been accused of something.

The boy reminds him of no one in particular.

I knew from his history that he had lost a child. I had him repeat this story to me. At the age of 18 he had begun a liaison with the aforementioned seamstress and had given her financial assistance. (He was the son of wealthy parents.) The relationship lasted six years, during which she bore him three children. The first two children died very young. The third is still alive. The seamstress subsequently married a simple man who accepted the child and brought it up. The first two children had been sent out to board and died of exhaustion before they were a year old.

They had been boarded out to an "angel-maker"! This is the name popu-

larly given to women who, in return for a good fee, free the mothers of illicit children of their burdens by letting the little ones starve to death.

Now the meaning of the dream was clear. It was his child that he saw on the roof and which had been made an "angel" by its mother. The trial was his summons before the forum of his conscience. He had permitted two children to starve and had relinquished a third to the mercy of a strange and perhaps coarse man. Isn't there such a thing as punitive justice?

His whole life is a walking on the edge of a frightful abyss. He is a criminal. He is a child-murderer! Strictly (morally) speaking, he was the murderer of his own children.

And now the outbreak of his malady is comprehensible. That day in the restaurant he had been very hungry and had pounced on his food. Then the idea must have occurred to him: "My child must have been as hungry as this!"—And the meat stuck in his throat.

His neurosis was conscience-begotten, *a disease of conscience*. His child occurred to him every time he ate. The "alter ego" within him ever kept saying: "You are a criminal! You let two children die of hunger, and you have no right to satiety!"

His neurosis was the *poena talionis*. He had sentenced himself to this penalty. The analysis of his succeeding dreams proved the correctness of this idea. Again and again the children appear to him in some shape or other. In one of his dreams he sees the surviving child, torn and ragged, selling newspapers in the streets of the metropolis. It oppresses him to think that his own flesh and blood should lead such a life.

Prior to the analysis he had paid no attention to his dreams and even maintained he almost never dreamt. Now everything was clear to him. He had been told by his mistress that he often moaned and cried out in his sleep. Many nights he awoke with a frightful air-hunger and struggled frantically for air. With this aerophagia he complicated his malady. He could eat best in the morning—after the sufferings of the night. The dream freed him temporarily from his difficulty in eating, for in it he paid his "conscience toll." During the day he did not think of the children and the inner ego ("it") punished him through "unconscious thoughts."

He soon learned to know himself and was able to eat. We see, then, that the neurosis represents a kind of moral purification. He had begun a trivial and frivolous relationship with the trained nurse, but now he wished to stop that kind of life. What he failed to do in the case of the seamstress he made up for with his new love. He married her and once for all put an end to his erotic escapades. He made adequate provision for his child's welfare and in a short time his difficulty in eating disappeared.

(Translated by S. A. Tannenbaum.)

REVIEWS

SADGER, DR. J. (*Vienna*).—Sleep Walking and Moon Walking: A Medico-Literary Study.—Translated by Louise Brink.—*Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series*, No. 31.—New York, Washington: Nerv. and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1920, 8 vo., wrappers, pp. X, 140.—\$2.00.

Noctambulism or sleep-walking has as yet received but little serious consideration at the hands of psychologists and of psychoanalysts. Dr. Sadger was led to the study of this very interesting but by no means common phenomenon by the analyses of two hysterical patients. The questions that particularly attracted him were, first, why the sleep-walker has to leave his bed; second, what rôle the light of the moon plays in the process. The conclusions, which he is frank enough to admit are tentative, may be thus summarized:

1. Sleep-walking, like dreams, is the fulfillment of repressed wishes of a sexual nature and is based on infantile experiences, the chief wish being a desire to get into the bed of the beloved person.
2. The sleep-walker sometimes identifies himself with the beloved person and re-enacts some past incident or incidents.
3. The sleep-walker takes advantage of the fact that he is asleep to perform various forbidden things and not be held accountable for them. (Pleasure without guilt!)
4. Heightened muscular irritability and muscular erotism contribute to sleep-walking. The phenomenon therefore occurs with especial frequency in the offspring of alcoholics, sadists and hysterics. Hysteria and noctambulism frequently go together. Sadger thinks that homosexuality also plays an important rôle. Sadistic, voyeuristic and exhibitionistic purposes unquestionably often lead to somnambulism, but Sadger says nothing about them.
5. In sleep-walking and moon-walking (lunatism) we have a reminiscence of two infantile experiences: 1, the mother going to the child's bed with a lighted candle to see if the youngster is asleep; 2, the child being awakened from a sleep and put on the chamber so that it may not wet the bed. Dr. Sadger thinks it not impossible that in some unexplained physical way the moon may exert a special power of attraction on the sleeper. He is convinced that the light of the moon, which lures the sleeper, may be identified with the mother, a lover, or even the nates of the beloved person!

The only one of these conclusions that I consider scientifically demonstrated is that which I have expressed in the above paragraph under the 3d heading. Not so long ago I had an opportunity to study a married woman, not living with her husband, who in her sleep walked into the apartment of a bachelor friend living on the floor above her, had coitus with him and went back to her bed. A few days later she was haunted with an idea that she had dreamt or had actually gone through the above experience. She was so situated that she could not ask the man about it. Subsequent events proved that what she had believed a fantasy had been a sleep-walking reality.

I have recently analysed a man about forty years of age, who was addicted to sleep-walking when he was about twelve years of age, but there was no history of his having wet the bed longer than is normal, or of his mother having come to his bed with a light to see about his health or to awaken him. It is worth mentioning that this patient's mother was also analysed by me and that she corroborated her son's statements in every point.

The second part of Dr. Sadger's book is devoted to an examination of works of fiction in which sleep-walking is depicted or plays a rôle. Needless to say, Dr. Sadger construes everything in these books in a manner to "prove" that the novelists and the dramatists, including Shakespeare, had given a faithful description of the phenomenon and had to all intents and purposes anticipated Sadger. In this way he finds proofs of the correctness of his theories.

The kind of material of which Sadger builds up his cases in the literary section of his book is illustrated by the following statement in his discussion of the sleep-walking scene in "Macbeth." He says (p. 128): "Now we know from neuropsychology that burning ambition in later years represents a reaction formation to infantile bed-wetting." This statement, though apparently based on Freud, is, to put it mildly, not scientifically accurate. We know only that in 1908 Freud said: "So far I am acquainted only with the immoderate 'burning' ambition ('Ehrgeiz') of the erstwhile enuretic." But this is a very different thing from saying that all intense ambition is the result of infantile bed-wetting. ("Infantile bed-wetting" and "Enuresis" are not the same.) All infants wet the bed but they do not all grow up to be inordinately ambitious or to walk in their sleep. And surely Dr. Sadger does not really think that intense or 'burning' ambition has its origin only in bed-wetting! Does he mean to say that the self-preservation impulse, the will for power, the exhibitionistic and narcissistic impulses do not contribute to make a person ambitious to achieve honor, wealth, distinction? Enuresis due to some organic malady or to a childhood psychoneurosis may, like any other cause for a feeling of inferiority, occasionally be responsible for a consuming ambition in subsequent years, but an analyst is going too far, much too far, when he attempts to explain every case of ambition, or even only inordinate ambition, by taking enuresis for granted and leaving all other factors out of consideration.

One who has himself translated psychoanalytic literature from the German into English and who realizes the thanklessness and unprofitableness of such a task, finds it very difficult, almost painful, to criticise a translator's work unfavorably. Miss Brink's translation of Sadger is probably no worse than the other translations of the works of the Freudian school, but it is certainly no better. It is a pity that such important work as the translation of scientific writings from the German into English is so often undertaken by persons without literary equipment and with only little knowledge of these languages. Miss Brink's translation is not only inelegant but extremely inaccurate. She repeatedly uses the adjectives "casuistic" and "erotic" as translations of the German nouns "Kasuistik" and "Erotik," instead of using the nouns "casuistry" and "eroticism." She speaks of people "smacking" in their sleep when she should say "smacking their lips." At times she wholly misrepresents her author's meaning. Thus, she says (page IX): "That has been my good fortune twice, where I have been able to lift the curtain, though only a little, in two cases among my patients and also in individuals who were otherwise healthy." What Sadger really says is: "That has been my good fortune twice, whereas in a few other cases, among patients and also in individuals who were otherwise healthy, I have been able to lift the curtain, though only a little." Instead of saying "I will sleep in the adjoining room," she says: "I will sleep in the little room next." One constantly reads such locutions as this, "At thirteen years old," "already at two year old." We are amazed to read that the patient's mother "doubled herself with laughter." On page 13 we are treated to this: "I always barred the door of the room, which near the other door of our other house, opened upon a small passage." On page IX we are told that "Tieck has given unrestrained expression to his passionate love toward this heavenly body in different portions of his works." Here is what Sadger wrote: "Tieck has in various parts of his works given enthusiastic expression to his passionate love for the star of night." How utterly unqualified Miss Brink is for her task is abundantly proved by her translation of the simple sentence, "Wir wohnten wegen des Geschäftes parterre." She translates it: "On account of the shop we lived on an upper floor." The sentence really means: "For business reasons we lived on the ground floor." That the translation is also influenced by Miss Brink's "complexes" seems to be indicated (page 129) by her unconscious attribution of a very gross kind of error to Dr. Sadger. According to her translation she makes this learned author speak of "treason against the life of the king" of England in 1601, although Dr. Sadger knew and correctly says that in 1601 England was ruled by a queen. The high-water mark of absurdity in translation occurs on p. 131 where Freud is made to speak of the dead "shivering [instead of "freezing"] in the cold grave"; but in justice to Miss Brink it must be said that she is quoting Freud at second hand from Brill's authorised translation of the "Traumdeutung," 3d ed., p. 125. Such work is inexcusable. S. A. T.

HORTON, L. H.:—How "STIMULUS AND REACTION" EXPLAINS LEVITATION DREAMS. *The J. of Abn. Psych.* (Boston). April 1920. (15: 11-35). *Illustrated.*

The psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams is parodied and caricatured with a great deal of self-satisfaction by the learned author. The illustrations are clever.

S. A. T.

DANA, CHAS. L., M.D. (New York): DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND MEDICINE. *Medical Record* (New York), Aug. 28, 1920. (98:337-341.)

A reader who expects to find in Professor Dana's essay a contribution to the subject of the relationship between psychology and medicine or of the application of psychology to medical practice will be grievously disappointed, for it is nothing more than a compilation of definitions of a large number of terms employed in psychology, e.g., sensation, perception, ideation, concept, reasoning, emotion, etc. Psychoanalytic terms are not defined, though many of them are mentioned in what is unquestionably a very good definition of dynamic psychology. But we were greatly interested in noting that Dr. Dana is almost wholly convinced of the existence of "subconscious" mental activities and is willing to admit that the hypothetical laws of the conceptual psychology of the psychoanalysts "may be wholly and are certainly partly true." We are pleased, too, to read that "to a large extent this psychology tells us in scientific or technical language what human nature and ordinary psychology already know. Since the beginning of neurology at least, we have known, for example, that a woman's headaches and hysteria were her methods of defense and self-exploitation. Its essential merit has been to show most emphatically the high organization, influence, and importance of the subconscious activities." But we most strenuously except to his statement that "healthy brains have no delusions or obsessions, no morbid fears" . . . that where there is a morbid mental phenomenon "there is always some defect of structure."

S. A. T.

CORY, C. E., Ph.D. (Washington University).—A SUBCONSCIOUS PHENOMENON. *The J. of Abn. Psych.* (Boston), Febr. 1920 (14: 369-375).

Dr. Cory reports very sketchily and briefly a case of automatic drawing in a spinster "rather delicate in health," fifty years of age, slightly deaf, of strong feelings, but extremely reserved in the expression of her feelings, given to "emotional strain" and to elaborate hallucinations. We are also told that the woman's "natural reserve" has "provided a complete and systematic repression of her emotional life." No analysis is attempted. The drawings, two of which are reproduced, are said to possess considerable merit as works of art, but in this there is nothing surprising when one learns that the subject has had a somewhat extended training in art. To us the only interesting feature in the case is the statement that while the drawing is in progress there is "a degree of anesthesia" in the arm, "and if the drawing is prolonged a pronounced numbness sets in."

S. A. T.

MACCURDY, J. T., M. D. (*New York*)—THE PATHOLOGY AND TREATMENT OF INSOMNIA IN FATIGUE AND ALLIED STATES. *The Jl. of Abn. Psych.*, April 1920, (15:45-54).

The author maintains that the insomnia accompanying fatigue and allied states (cerebral concussion, shock, etc.) is due to psychic mechanisms which interfere with the natural recuperation. According to MacCurdy "weariness and an instinctive tendency to avoid that which occasions it, leads the patient to concentrate his attention abnormally and to respond to any environmental stimuli with restless activity. Unconsciously lazy, he becomes pathologically active." Then the patient begins to long for death to terminate his sufferings, and this manifests itself in the fear of accidents, questionings as to the value of life, an apparently purposeless restlessness, and a recoiling from sleep (the symbol of death). Considering that the true Freudian maintains that the unconscious does not know death or any negation, we are surprised to read that "the patient's unconscious demands death or complete abandonment of all earthly struggle, against which his fore-conscious (or whatever level of awareness is the home of our biological impulses) is actively fighting. The reactions of the day are consequently exaggerated. The organism is in conflict, so that the more he tries to give way to sleep the more his muscles contract, the more wildly do his thoughts circle around his normal environment and problems."

Dr. MacCurdy's explanation of the "Sisyphus task" dream is so ingenious that we quote it. He says: "As universal experience attests, we sink to a lower level during sleep, so it is not surprising to find the wish for release from the irksome task reach a plainer expression than in waking hours. The unconscious says: 'Throw over the responsibility!' Consciousness says: 'Play the game!' A compromise is reached in the fatigue dream, where the occupation of the day is depicted in a form impossible of accomplishment, or symbolized in a situation that is ridiculous" (e.g., painting a huge barn with a toothbrush). Ingenious but not at all convincing.

S. A. T.

SCHRENCK-NOTZING, DR. A.:—Die Wachsuggestion auf der öffentlichen Schaubühne. [*Waking Suggestion on the Public Stage.*] *Arch. f. Kriminologie*, vol. 72, No. 2; 1920.

Schrenck-Notzing vigorously protests against all hypnotic seances and all public experiments with waking suggestion. But, alas, his warning comes too late! The technique of suggestion has become a form of parlor entertainment and already plays an important rôle in criminality. In most cases the procedure—a variety of fascination—is employed for sexual purposes. A girl in a strange house is fascinated, experiences something and subsequently does not know what happened to her. Now and then this amnesia is feigned and the fascination is a—"vis haud ingrata."

STEKEL. (T.)

SCHNEIDER, RUDOLPH. (*Munich*):—Zu Freuds analytischer Untersuchungsmethode des Zahleneinfalls. [*Concerning Freud's Method of Studying Numbers Chosen Arbitrarily.*] *Internat. Zeitschr. f. Psychoanalyse*, 1920, 6:75-79.

This essay, notwithstanding its brevity, is one of the most important recent contributions to psychoanalytic literature. The author offers convincing proof that Freud has not proved that the choice of a random number is unconsciously determined. As we know, Freud maintains that when a number enters a person's mind 'accidentally,' i. e., without a conscious evocation of that particular number, that number is definitely related to several or many trains of thought in the unconscious and that the appearance of that number in consciousness was determined by those unconscious thoughts; in other words, owing to the operation of the affective energy investing those ideas at that particular time, no other number could then have been chosen by the individual in response to a challenge to name the first number that came to his mind. Freud and others have thought that they proved their thesis when they analyzed examples of such numbers and found that the patients or subjects produced significant thoughts which could be brought into relationship with these numbers and to the numerals composing them. In some instances these numerals were juggled with in marvelous ways to produce the published results. Mr. Schneider is convinced that the connection between these numbers and the associated ideas is forced, that the idea is determined by the number and not the number by the idea; in other words, that after the number has been produced the subject proceeds to find ideas to fit the numerals. The author very ingeniously proves this by finding his "complexes" in a number taken arbitrarily and mechanically from a page in a book and by finding the "complexes" of other persons in numbers arbitrarily selected by himself.

We reproduce herewith one of his analyses:

"I take down a volume of history and decide to select a number. To make sure that my choice will be wholly accidental I impose on myself the following conditions: I will analyse the first number that I find on the left-hand side of the page where I shall open. I open the book and find page 1183. I concentrate my attention on this number and at once I think of 8 and 3, i.e. August 3, my birthday. I turn my attention to the first half of the number,—11—i.e., 1911, the year of my re-birth, hence my lucky number; in 1911 I was freed from military service, service that I detested. I really looked on that as a kind of re-birth. And now unexpectedly this train of ideas comes up: 8 plus 3 equals 11; twice 11, my lucky number "duplicated": 11 and 11. "If the matter were not complicated" (i.e., single) it would be 1 and 1; you and I (my bride—who now occurs to my mind); but we are "double": 11 and 11. Besides, there is a joke in the "arithmetic of love" in which 1 plus 1 equals marriage. (I had been recently thinking seriously about marriage.) But marriage would in a way

be my third (3) re-birth. But if I add up 1 plus 1 plus 8 plus 3, I find 13, an unlucky number, and if I take 3 from 11 I get 8, i.e., Beware!* Thus I have twice 8: 8! 8! Acht! Acht! i.e., beware! beware! bad luck! (13.) But it may also mean: 11, 11, Elf, Elf,* 'luck in marriage! And now I recollect that I made my bride's acquaintance in August, the 8th month, and we know each other 3 years.

"The association that spontaneously occurs to me now is this: the last few weeks I have thought very intensively about my approaching marriage (in November, the 11th month) in which I hope to realize a 3d rebirth. But notwithstanding my strong hopes (elf, elf, happiness), my confidence is somewhat shaken, for I have a "double," a two-fold nature, and she too, and the matter, as a whole, is not "simple" (single). (Beware! Beware! Caution! Hard luck!) The analysis, therefore, excellently expresses my present affective attitude, although it was not linked with a number emerging from my inner self, but with a wholly unknown number to which I sought ideas that would match after I had obtained the number."

The importance of this to dream analysis and to the analysis of other spontaneous mental products needs hardly to be stressed by us. S. A. T.

HAHN:—Verdrängungen bei nicht-hysterischen Zuständen. [*Repressions in non-hysterical conditions.*] *Archiv f. Psych. u. Nervenkrank.*, vol. 61. No. 3.

Hahn attempts to prove, by two not very happily chosen examples of repression, that the mechanism of repression, described by Freud, plays a rôle in various psychopathological conditions,—a fact about which modern psychiatrists and psychologists probably have no longer any doubt. STEKEL. (T.)

CHOWRIN, A. N.:—Experimentelle Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete des räumlichen Hellsehens. Nach den russischen Original bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Dr. A. Schrenck-Notzing. [*Experimental Investigations in spatial clairvoyance. The Russian original worked over and issued by Dr. Schrenck-Notzing.*] München, 1919. (Ernst Reinhardt.)

The book deals with a very interesting series of experiments which were published in Russian in 1898 and proves by the method of exact experimentation the verity of telepathic transference. The medium was a hysterical (female) school teacher. A postscript by Professor Sikorskij calls attention to the similarity between these results and those obtained by Janet and by Richet. The facts as such, e.g., the reading of sealed letters, seem to be proved. Whether the Russian physician's explanations are correct is disputable. I doubt them.

STEKEL. (T.)

* In German "eight" is Acht" and "hab' Acht" means "beware, be careful!" The word for "eleven" is "Oelf," which suggests "elf" (fairy).—T.

VON GEIJERSTAMM, DR. EMANUEL:—Ueber die Psychoanalyse der Züricherschule. [*The Zürich School of Psychoanalysis.*] *Zeitschr. f. Psychotherapie*, vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, 1920.

What is true of all new movements and theories is true also of psychoanalysis. All sorts of sects arise and each claims to be the sole possessor of *the* truth, the true road to the desired goal. Among the pupils of Freud who have made themselves independent, Jung has probably found most favor in America. A careful study of the substituted teachings proves that the differences are too trifling to justify Jung's secession, although it must be admitted that Freud's insistence on orthodoxy is a driving goad to revolt. Freud emphasizes the sexual, whereas Jung sees in a shrinking from one's life's tasks the primary fact in the neuroses. The shrinking determines a regression of the libido into infantile channels. Geijerstamm attempts, by means of numerous examples, to give a clear explanation of these departures from Freud, but cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that most of the tenets of the Jung school are to be found in Freud. The neurotic's feeling of guilt Geijerstamm attributes to a deficiency of belief. "What is belief but an acceptance of congenital progressive tendencies?" inquires our author and confuses "belief itself" [i.e., absolute belief] with religious belief. This naturally opens the way for false deductions. The neurotic lacks a belief in himself; his soul is bipolarly dominated by a secret delusion of greatness and an oppressive feeling of inferiority. This feeling of inferiority has its origin in a consciousness of guilt which has many roots. The guilty feeling may emanate from the sexual sphere, from the individual's criminality, but it may also be due to the fact that the neurotic has not fulfilled his internal imperative. Jung's teachings offer us nothing new; they add only a few important supplementary data which other pupils of Freud have also insisted upon and worked out.

STEKEL. (T.)

GALANT, DR. S.:—Entwicklungsgeschichte einer Katatonie. [*The Development of a Case of Catatonia.*] *Arch. f. Psych. u. Nerv.*, vol. 62, No. 1.

Galant wants to prove that there are psychoses which cannot be explained by Freud's formulas. He battles against Freud's slogan: "dementia precox—narcistic neurosis,"—and permits himself the following bold assertion: "Freud's rôle of drawing our attention to the individual's sexual life is done; in fact, it is overdone. His excessive zeal in this direction will not contribute to his fame." Galant's work, let it be said at once, is not destined to shake or undermine Freud's teachings about schizophrenia. He treats us to an autobiographic life-history and clinical report of a catatonic patient who says not a word of his sexual life. The conclusions Galant draws relate to an affective blurring or blotting-out of the boundaries between fantasy and reality. Way back in 1912 I maintained in my [still untranslated] book on 'the dreams of poets' (p. 17) that if I wished to define the term "neurosis" I could not do it otherwise than

to say it was the condition in which the boundaries between fantasy and reality are blurred. The neurotic has this quality in common with the child. Galant terms this childish faculty of taking fantasy for reality *the realizing fantasy*. He thinks that in the child this realizing fantasy is a constructive process and in the catatonic a destructive process. The development of catatonia seems to the author to be as follows: "a rich affectivity which is expended uselessly and which consequently brings about a gradual regression, and as a result of an ever increasing regression of affectivity there results a complete affective imbecility." Looked at squarely, this is just what Freud asserts, only that he puts the sexual emotions in the foreground. Freud, too, regards catatonia as a regression to a stage of infantilism. Galant's report says absolutely nothing about the sexual life of the patient and the case cannot therefore be said to prove anything one way or the other.

STEKEL. (T.)

JANET, PROFESSOR PIERRE:—LES MEDICATIONS PSYCHOLOGIQUES. ETUDES HISTORIQUES, PSYCHOLOGIQUES ET CLINIQUES SUR LES METHODES DE LA PSYCHOTHERAPIE. [*Psychological Medicine. An historical, psychological and clinical study of Methods of Psychotherapy.*] Paris. (Felix Alcan), 1919. 3 volumes.

The first of these three splendid volumes consists of an exhaustive history of psychotherapeutics and is written in a manner that fills us with admiration for the author's profound knowledge and extensive reading. Not only magnetism, Christian Science, hypnotism and Dubois's method of persuasion, but all other psychotherapeutic methods are clearly, comprehensively and thoughtfully set forth. Janet also lets us know just where he stands with respect to psychoanalysis. Quite properly he refers to his priority in the investigation of the unconscious and of fixed ideas and shows how many of the peculiarities of the psychoneuroses he knew quite clearly long before Freud. In the work of this brilliant French investigator the reader will find literal statements of many of Adler's theses, e.g., the feeling of inferiority in the neurotic, the need for simplification and the meaning of spastic attitudes. He assigns a sexual etiology to not more than 75 per cent of cases of neuroses and proposes the introduction of the term "Freudian syndrome" for the phenomena of repression. Everywhere we find hints of a psychological analysis of the author's cases, but unfortunately only hints. Janet was not destined to reach the nuclear fact of the neuroses. After all, he is only the forerunner of Freud, even though we must grant him the distinction of having been the first one to show Freud the way into the wilderness of the unconscious. The reading of this work is absolutely necessary for every neurologist and psychiatrist. Only after-ages will determine how great Janet's contributions to modern medical psychology were, but his name will always be linked with that of Freud.

STEKEL. [S. A. T.]

CLARK, DR. L. P. (*New York*):—A Clinical Study of Some Mental Contents in Epileptic Attacks.—*Psychoanalytic Review*, Oct., 1920 (7:366-375).

This is Dr. Clark's third contribution to the study of the mental content during and following epileptic attacks, in the hope that such study will "help solve the real nature and defect of the epileptic as an individual and to find the psychologic conflicts which aid in bringing on the attack" and that we will thus be placed in possession of a "rational method of treating the individual case." With this purpose in view, Dr. Clark studies the oral productions and the behavior of the epileptic in the transitory deliria and befogged mental states following *pétit mal* and compares these with the patient's conflicts of earlier life, as far as these are ascertainable. The paper is illustrated with nine examples of *pétit mal* attacks and analytic comments on the patients' utterances and behavior just prior to, during and after the attacks. In a number of these there was no difficulty in recognizing the fact that the patients were "really enacting a sexual assault and that the *pétit mal* liberated the unconscious dramatization of an erotic desire." Dr. Clark seems to have overlooked the fact that some of these "attacks" (Examples 5 and 9) represented homicidal assaults resulting from injured narcissism.

To us Dr. Clark's conclusion is very disappointing. He says: "In epilepsy we have not only an exhibition of crude sexuality but an apparent *defect of the instinct* itself showing an actual *inferiority of the instinct*; hence *we may not analyse it out*, but must make a *compromise analysis* of it and give our patients an acceptable sublimation and educational training to help them to a life of effort and pleasure compatible to [sic] the inherent defects of instinct which they possess." With most of this, especially the parts we have italicized, we do not agree. The cases in which the *pétit mal* is a psychoneurosis, and that is probably true of most of the cases, there is no defect in the sexual instincts and a thorough-going psychanalysis, combined with proper re-education, will bring about a cure. That "the percentage of recovery in epileptics is so small" is due not to "a defective mental endowment" and to "an emotional poverty not often seen in other types of nervous invalids," but to inefficient and insufficient analysis. Sufferers from psychogenetic *pétit mal* and grand mal exhibit an emotional poverty no more than other sufferers from psychoneuroses.

To our great regret we find Dr. Clark at times unintelligible, e.g., in the following no doubt important sentence in his concluding paragraph: "It may be just possible that the spontaneous productions in all deliriant (drug, fever and psychogenic) when finally analyzed, freed from symbolisms, may not be dynamic and causative of the disorder itself, but it would seem that all these states are the freeing forces loosening conscious inhibitions and allowing these direct emanations from the unconscious to appear." We cannot understand how the spontaneous productions (query: symptoms?) can be freed from

symbolisms, how they can be the causes of the disorders, how they can loosen the inhibitions and how they can make themselves appear from the unconscious.

On page 367 Dr. Clark, probably without intending to do so, implies that he was the first one to make a "systematic attempt to reduce to a coherent meaning the mental content of the automatic state of *petit mal*." His earliest essay on the subject of the mental content of epileptic attacks is dated October 13th, 1917; Dr. Stekel's pioneer work on 'the psychic treatment of epilepsy' was published in the *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse* in 1911.

S. A. T.

VILLINGER, WERNER:—Gibt es psychogene, nicht hysterische Psychosen auf normalpsychischer Grundlage? [*Are there psychogenetic, not hysterical, Psychoses on a normal psychological Basis?*] *Zeitsch. f. d. g. Neur. u. Psych.*, vol. 57, 1920.

Villinger investigates the psychogenesis of a very interesting case of a female infanticide: a peasant girl permitted herself to be deflowered by a Russian prisoner of war, refused any subsequent congress and murdered her infant. Even before her imprisonment she manifested those symptoms of psychosis which Goethe so brilliantly described in *Marguerite*. Villinger concludes that there is a psychogenetic psychosis. Healthy individuals may become psychotic from psychic causes. I am not at all sure that there was not an endogenous disposition to a psychosis. As I have maintained in my essay on 'the sexual traumata of adults' (cf. my book on 'sexual anesthesia in woman,' 1919) a woman's first sexual experience is the touchstone of her mentality. In the present case one needs to consider the girl's many motives, her reproaches and her conscience pangs. Her dreams, too, give hints of deeper matters which permit us to assume a condition corresponding to a latent hysteria. One who develops a psychosis in the wake of a psychic conflict must already be constitutionally predisposed to a psychosis. This predisposition consists in an organic inferiority of the central nervous system or in such an extreme dissociation of personality as we find in schizophrenia.

STEKEL. (T.)

BOWMAN, DR. K. M.:—Analysis of a Case of War Neurosis.—*Psychoanalytic Rev.*, Oct., 1920. (7:317-332.)

This simple and straightforward account of a case of "war neurosis" (a term that sounds better than "shell-shock") is of very great interest, for it shows how much can be accomplished by a sympathetic and intelligent physician, even with only a brief (and consequently not very profound or thorough) psychoanalytic investigation of the psychoneuroses. The patient, a married man of 33, had been inducted into the army, notwithstanding obvious unfitness for military duty. "Apprehension Neurosis" became acute after he had been blown up during the German offensive of March, 1918. The patient suffered from the following psychic symptoms: frequent attacks of severe depression, headaches, a cervical tic, dizziness, peculiar sensations in the body, an inability to concentrate his attention, a fear of death, and an obsessive idea of killing one of his

nurses (a "Sister"). Even before his war experience the patient had suffered from depression, neuralgia, a fear of tuberculosis (his mother and his sister had died of this disease), a fear of death, obsessive visions of dead people, ejaculatio precox, and often had hallucinations of seeing and conversing with a girl he had loved prior to his marriage.

The analysis showed that the patient was really suffering from "sexual abstinence" because his wife had refused to perform her share of the conjugal rites and presumably would not permit her husband to gratify his libido elsewhere or he feared to indulge in extra-marital coitus. As a result of Dr. Bowman's advice this matter seems to have been properly adjusted and the patient reported himself "cured." We have our doubts about the permanency of this cure, chiefly because we do not believe that the sexual problem was really solved. A woman may consent to have coitus when she has only one child, and that child four or five years old, but she probably won't after she has two or three children. And what is to become of her husband then? We are suspicious of Dr. Bowman's sincerity in this matter when he tells us that he instructed his patient that marriage involved "mutual sacrifice." What was the unfortunate husband to sacrifice?

That the patient's symptoms disappeared with the analysis and indulgence in sexualibus is very fortunate but, as we said above, we doubt the permanency of the cure. Many of the symptoms were wholly unexplained or only very superficially. The patient's extremely neurotic reaction to his mother's death and his fear of tuberculosis point to a consciousness of guilt in connection with her death,—probably an unconscious wish followed by unconscious self-punishment (*lex talionis*). The patient's obsessive fears of killing the Sister and his many obsessive ideas about his own death and that of his friends and of people whose faces he didn't see, all point to a repressed desire for somebody's death—undoubtedly his wife's. The desire to kill the nurse probably masked a sexual desire. Homosexuality is clearly hinted at in one of the dreams. But of all these things Dr. Bowman says nothing, probably because the patient was "cured" before it became necessary to speak of these matters.

The case also furnishes interesting proof, as Dr. Bowman points out, that at least some cases of shell-shock neurosis were due to psychic conflicts commencing in civil life before the war.

S. A. T.

KISCH, DR. FRANZ:—Menschenzucht. Ein Merkbuch für die Reifen beiderlei Geschlechts. [*Human Breeding. Memorandum for Adults of both Sexes.*] Bohn, 1920. (A. Marcus & Weber).

This is a popular statement of the principles of modern eugenics. The significance of propagation as a social factor is adequately emphasized. The little book presents us with nothing new, contains no new ideas, but is well written and fulfills its purpose of explaining in a worthy form the significance of the sexual life.

STEKEL.

SPENCE, LEWIS: AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF OCCULTISM. A COMPENDIUM OF INFORMATION ON THE OCCULT SCIENCES, OCCULT PERSONALITIES, PSYCHIC SCIENCE, DEMONOLOGY, SPIRITISM AND MYSTICISM. *New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1920. xiv. 451 pages.*

The book under review fills a great want long felt by all students of the occult and psychical sciences. The encyclopaedias and general books of reference have always proven a deep disappointment in regard to these subjects. Even Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* cannot be expected to deal comprehensively with these esoteric matters. This important and imposing department of human thought has not till now been presented in reference form. Collin de Plancy's *Dictionnaire Infernal* (1st ed., 1818; 6th ed., 1863) has limited itself, as the title indicates, to Demonology, Magic and Witchcraft. The same thing is true of J. W. Horst's *Zauberbibliothek* (6 vols., 1820-25), which has been called a perfect cyclopedia of magic.

It may unhesitatingly be said that the author has acquitted himself well of his task. But in a compendium of information of such vast proportions—the book contains over 1,500 entries—the reader must not expect the final word on all the subjects treated. The sections, in view of their variety, necessarily will prove more or less uneven. Some are more satisfactory than others. Not all branches of the occult sciences have been presented in a uniformly authoritative manner; and as the author himself is an anthropologist, his own special field naturally is given with greater accuracy than the others. The author has but in very few cases solicited the contributions of experts. And as he asks in the introduction for corrections in any of the subjects, which are somewhat removed from his own field of interest, the present reviewer will jot down a few observations noted down while examining the contents of the book.

Devil-worship, it may well be asserted, never existed among the Masons, the recent "discoveries" of the Roman Catholic writers, such as Archbishop Meurin, Leo Taxil and others, to the contrary notwithstanding. The author does not seem to know that Léo Taxil (pseudonym of M. Gabriel Jogaud-Pagès), who also wrote under the names of Dr. Bataille and Miss Diana Vaughan, finally admitted that it was all a hoax. Mr. Spence seems to put great credence in the statement of J. K. Huysmans (cf. his preface to Jules Bois's *le Satanisme et la Magie*) in regard to the frequent thefts of consecrated wafers from Catholic churches in France and Belgium for the Black Mass. This subject has been recently treated by Mr. Maximilian J. Rudwin in his article, "The Satanism of J. K. Huysmans" in *The Open Court*.

The writer of the article "Symbolism in Art" does not seem to be aware of the original signification of the fish as a sacred symbol of the fertility goddess. The ancient pagan practice of eating fish on the Virgin's Day (Freya Day or Friday) has been retained by the Catholic Church, which did not fail, however, to supply a different reason for the observance.

The name of the "Dance of Death" was not first applied, as stated in the article "Obsession and Possession," to the procession of the flagellants. The Masque of Death had its origin in the Carnival masked dances, which go back to the days of primitive culture (cf. Mr. Rudwin's monograph *The Origin of the German Carnival Comedy*, p. 34).

According to church tradition, the archangel, who led the faithful hosts of heaven in the war against the devil and his angels, received his name from the war-cry, with which he rallied around his banner all who were for God. The Hebrew word Michael was interpreted by the church fathers to mean: He who is for God. To say that the archangel Michael owed his name to the fact that he was equal to God (cf. the article "Michael") would not only do violence to Jewish monotheism, but would also lay the champion of God's cause bare to the sin which brought about his enemy's downfall and which he took upon himself to punish.

The devil's appellation "Old Nick" has been derived, as stated as an hypothetical definition in the article on that name, from the river spirit in northern countries, "Neck," "Nikke" or "Nokke." In Gerhart Hauptmann's fairy play, *The Sunken Bell*, we find a water-spirit named Nickelmann. It would seem that Old Nick and St. Nicholas are identical in origin. The name of the Christian saint, who is the patron of the mariners and consequently proves his original connection with water, has probably been derived from Semit. *nahal*, *nihal*, "to flow" or "to float" (cf. Rudwin, *op. cit.*, p. 8).

The *incubi* and *succubi* came from the ancient Assyrians, who called them *lilit*. According to certain demonologists, the queen of the *succubi* is called Lilith. The Jews brought these sexual demons with them from their captivity and handed them on to the Christians. In Greece and Rome and in the northern countries of Europe these Asiatic demons were fused with the minor fertility spirits, such as satyrs, fauns, goblins, and sirens, a fact which was already admitted by Sinistrari d'Ameno. Huysmans calls them "ecclesiastical microbes," for the reason that monks and nuns are chiefly afflicted with them.

In conclusion the present reviewer is forced to say that the value of this book has been greatly impaired by the mass of typographical errors it contains. It is to be hoped that a competent proof-reader will be engaged for the next printing of this excellent compendium.

R.

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NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

[All books and pamphlets sent to us will be listed but only such will be reviewed as we deem likely to interest our readers. Items not reviewed in this issue will be reviewed in subsequent issues.]

The Evolution of the Dragon. By Prof. G. E. Smith. (*University of Manchester*) London, N. Y., Chicago, Calcutta, Madras: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919. 8vo, pp. xx, 234; copiously illustrated. Price, \$3.75. [Discusses: *Incense and Libations; Dragons and Rain Gods; the Birth of Aphrodite*.]

The Other Side God's Door; Messages from Lord Kitchener, Mary Baker Eddy, and others. By Mabel Nixon Robertson. New York; E. P. Dutton & Co., 1920. 12 mo; pp. x, 158. Price, \$2.50. [Supposed messages from the dead.]

The Initiate; some Impressions of a Great Soul. By his pupil. E. P. Dutton & Co., n.d. 12 mo; pp. x, 381. Price, \$2.50. [An occult novel of the

- Der telepathische Traum: meine Erfahrungen über die Phänomene des Hellsehens im Wachen u. im Traume.* [Telepathic Dreams: my experiences in clairvoyance while awake and while dreaming.] By Wilhelm Stekel, M.D.—Berlin: J. Baum, 1920. 8vo., wrappers, pp. 44. Price, M.2.
- Masken der Sexualität: Der innere Mensch.* [Sex Masks: The inner man.] By Dr. W. Stekel. Wien: Paul Knepler, 1920. 12mo, cloth, pp. 148. [20 essays.]
- Die Impotenz des Mannes. Die psychischen Störungen der männlichen Sexualfunktion.* [Impotence in the Male. Psychic Disturbances in the Sexual Functions of the Male.] By Dr. W. Stekel. Berlin, Wien: Urban & Schwarzenberg, 1920. 8vo, bds., pp. xii, 482. Price, M. 110.
- Der Wille zum Leben: neue u. alte Wege zum Glück.* [The Will to Live. New and Old Roads to Happiness.] By W. Stekel, M.D., Berlin: Otto Salle, 1920. Cr. 8vo, wrappers, pp. 142. [19 essays.]
- Friedrich Hebbel: Ein psychoanalytischer Versuch.* [A psychoanalytic study of F. Hebbel.] By J. Sadger, M.D.—Leipzig, Wien: F. Deuticke, 1920. 8vo, wraps., pp. 374.
- Psychologie Générale. Tirée de l'Etude du Rêve.* [General Psychology. Based on the study of Dreams.] By A. Kaploun.—Lausanne: Payot & Cie, 1919. 205 pp. Price, 4f.50.
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- The Romantic.* By May Sinclair.—New York: Macmillan Co., 1920. 8vo, [A novel with a decidedly Freudian motive.]
- Types of Mental Defectives.* By Dr. M. W. Barr and Mr. E. F. Maloney.—Phila: P. Blakiston's Son & Co., 1920, 31 Plates containing 188 illustrations. 8vo, cloth, pp. VII, 179. \$3.00.
- Jenseits des Lustprinzips.* [Beyond the Pleasure-principle.] By Sigm. Freud.—Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1920. Large 8vo, wrappers, pp. 60.
- Proceedings of the International Conference of Women Physicians.* By various authors.—New York: The Woman's Press (600 Lex'ton Ave.), 1920, 6 vols, 8vo, wrappers, 1200 pp. Price, \$3.00 the set. [Volume I deals with *General Problems of Health*; vol. II with *Industrial Health*; vol. III with *The Health of the Child*; vol. IV with *Moral Codes and Personality*; vol. V with the *Adaptation of the Individual to Life*, and vol. VI with the *Conservation of Health of Women in Marriage*. An excellent series of essays of sociologic and psychologic interest.—Edited by Miss Katharine Anthony.]
- Margaret Fuller: A Psychological Biography.* By Katharine Anthony.—New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920, Cr. 8vo, cloth, pp. 223. Portrait.
- Moon-Calf: A novel,* by Floyd Dell.—New York: A. A. Knopf, 1920, 8vo, cloth, pp. 394. Price, \$2.50.
- Repressed Emotions.* By Dr. I. H. Coriat.—New York: Brentano's, 1920; Cr. 8vo, cloth, pp. 213.

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